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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY IN WESTERN GERMANY AND BRITAIN, 1975-1980 
by Rosalind Katharine Gaffney 
ABSTRACT 
The thesis comprises a comparative study of public attitudes in 
West Germany and Britain to the European Community, analysing the nature 
and extent of their support for European integration. The historical 
dimension of their entry and the background political situation is taken 
into account and also the possible influence of both politicians and the 
Media. 
Aspects of public opinion investigal:!:ed· include the acceptance of 
further European integration and the degree of adherence to national 
institutions as possibly overriding the European dimension. Consideration 
is also given to background social factors and socio-political attitudes, 
including feelings of well-being and also of liberal or traditional social 
values. Particular attention is paid to the relationship and conflict 
between instrumental and idealistic attitudes to the Community. Other 
topics dealt with are attitudes to new entrants and trust in fellow member 
States, levels of satisfaction at information available on the Community 
and views on Community policy priorities. Short accounts are given of the 
major landmarks, the 1975 British Referendum on Community membership and 
the 1979 elections to the European Parliament, giving some attention to 
the historical background. Differences in education and also a possible 
gender or age factor are included where differentiation is appropriate. 
ii 
The major statistical data are drawn from European Commission 
sponsored Eurobarometer opinion polls. Notice is also taken of statistical 
data provided by other British and German opinion poll organisations. The 
conclusion is that there is a greater similarity in attitudes in the two 
countries than has previously been recognised in the literature. Where 
attitudes differ, an attempt is made to explain such discrepancies or 
hazard an account as to how they came about. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The thesis covers the period 1975 to 1980, a period in recent 
political history which saw a landmark in European Community develop-
ments, that of the first direct elections to the European Parliament 
and a landmark in British politics~ that of the British Referendum on 
Membership of the European Community. The two States selected could 
be considered to be broadly similar, i.e. that they are North European 
with similar population and a comparable state of economic and social 
development. Throughout the thesis certain terms will be used. The 
term 'Britain' will describe both Britain and the United Kingdom and 
the term 'British' describes the people of these nations; there will 
be no differentiation. The terms 'Germany' and 'Germans' will be used 
to describe the State and peoples of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that attitudes to 'Europe' 
do differ considerably. However, are these countries as similar in 
their views and attitudes as one might expect? I intend to investigate 
these differences and attempt to account for them. One country, 
Germany, had in 1975, enjoyed membership of the European Community 
for around twenty years. The other, Britain, had been a member for 
barely two years and was,at the start of the year, still arguing about 
whether Britain should have actually joined or not - by 1980 this was 
no longer a serious question but one asks oneself whether differences 
in attitudes were fundamental and did the British draw closer to the 
Community over the five-year period? Did they increasingly share 
German attitudes, did they have them in the first place, or did they 
grow further apart? Certain background factors such as basic 
attitudes to life and to politics in general will be drawn into the 
discussion where they are considered important and relevant. Attention 
f.!(~ .. ", _ ..... ti......r~=. ...... ' ~~·-7 '\~'/4:f) 
\. "':?_;"' ./ 
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will also be paid to outside international developments which influenced 
public attitudes, for example, the very different economic situation 
pertaining to the 1970s. What effect did this have on the two nations? 
Did it affect them in a positive or negative way in terms of their 
attitudes to membership of the Community? The internal political 
situation of each nation will also be another point of consideration. 
The major source of information on public attitudes used was 
that of the Eurobarometer public opinion surveys. These are twice 
yearly surveys commissioned on behalf of the European Commission. 
They are systematic and are designed and conducted to a common programme 
throughout the European Community. Additional material in the form 
of published research articles and papers were vital sources of informa-
tion. Other organisations such as Gallup, for example, conducted 
surveys into public attitudes towards the European Community and some 
data are included in the thesis. 
Consideration will be taken of the media influence, if any, on 
attitudes towards the Community in the thesis. Information, or the 
lack of it, can have an important bearing on the formation of public 
attitudes and on the strengthening or eradication of prejudices which 
can influence attitudes. Therefore the thesis will incorporate a 
consideration of whether both nations express satisfaction with media 
information available on the Community and on Community issues. This 
might, as a result, offer an explanation for differences in attitudes 
where they exist. Finally, additional sources of information were 
provided by various European Community documentation and publications 
which covered various aspects of public attitudes on a specific and 
general basis. 
In this Introduction, I would now like to draw attention to the 
historical dimensions which have perhaps caused or had an influence 
2 
over the later national attitudes to Europe and the European Communities 
and which also perhaps provide an explanation for, for instance, 
attitudes to life which coloured people's attitudes to the European 
dimension. In September 1946 Winston Churchill, in a speech in Ztlrich, 
• 1 d 11 d f II k' d f ' d f II 1 Sw~tzer an, ca e or .•. A ~n o Un~te States o Europe .... 
When, however, discussions took place with a view to creating a system 
of closer unity between nations, it was clear that the British had 
a very different view of how such a system should be formulated. The 
British, after the Second World War, saw themselves still as belonging 
to a powerful nation, indeed a World, as well as a European power. 
Churchill's concept of overlapping circles of relationships with Europe, 
the Commonwealth and the United States of America was a fundamental 
belief which went on to colour the views of both public and politicians 
for quite a while. The British were with Europe, but not of it. 2 
Britain subsequently refused to join in the negotiations over the 
Schuman Plan and the further discussions into economic integration, 
preferring instead the creation of a European Free Trade Area which 
would not interfere with British trading arrangements with the Common-
wealth, which were still paramount. In 1961 the Conservative Government 
of Harold Macmillan made the first British application to join the 
European Community; it failed, being vetoed in 1963 by France under 
General de Gaulle. In October 1962, Hugh Gaitskell, the Leader of 
the Labour Party, gave a speech in which he insisted that Britain must 
remain free to plan her own economy and to determine her own foreign 
policy and he demanded safeguards for the Commonwealth, E.F.T.A. and 
for British agriculture. 3 However, following the General Election 
of 1964, the new Labour Government's dreams of rapid economic growth 
were to be shattered and a further application to join the Community 
was made in 1967. Thistoowas vetoed. It was not until the death 
3 
of President de Gaulle and a less hostile attitude towards British 
membership on the part of the French was to prevail that Britain was 
able to make a final, successful application to join under the 
Conservative Government of Edward Heath in the early 1970s. Britain 
formally became a member of the European Economic Community on 
1 January 1973. 
Economic reasons and foreign policy considerations had driven 
Britain into the arms of the Community. Years of economic and industrial 
problems and a decline in the British role on the World political stage 
were. primary considerations for joining and not an idealistic post-war 
drive for European unity. After years of watching European Community 
member countries doing well economically, the British were out for 
their share of European economic growth. But it was not a case of 
whole-hearted support for Europe, there were dissenters on all parts 
of the political spectrum and consideration of the protection of British 
interests was a major aspect of the Entry negotiations. The changing 
relationship with the Commonwealth and the subject of British 
Sovereignty were uppermost in British minds. 
The German situation was quite a different one. The United States 
of America had changed its policy towards the newly-divided Germany 
after the Second World War, seeing the revival of Western Germany as 
a bulwark against the U.S.S.R. As a result, rapid economic recovery 
took place in West Germany. But the French were very worried as they 
feared being confronted once again by this once-powerful neighbour. 
A new approach to an old solution was found by Jean Monnet and adopted 
by Schuman which would see a framework for common action in Western 
Europe and would embrace this old historical enemy of France. It was 
an opportunity which the West German Government chose to utilise, as 
the Federal Republic regained the status of an independent State during 
the period 1949-1955, and following many negotiations between Germany, 
4 
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France, Italy and the Benelux nations, Germany was one of the six 
original founder members of the European Communities Treaties (Euratom, 
E.C.S.C., the E.E.C.). Germany was also in a better economic state 
on entry into the European Community and subsequently did well out 
of membership in comparison to Britain when she joined, (initially 
owing to what has been termed the 'Economic Miracle'). Questions of 
sovereignty were not perceived as a problem; Germany had no 
Commonwealth, Empire or other ties to consider. She was a new country, 
seeking to re-establish herself on the international stage and trying 
to put disastrous years of war which had destroyed her credibility 
behind her. Britain, initially emerging as a victor in the War had 
seen her political and economic situation decline and it was to be 
very unfortunate from Britain's point of view that her entry into, 
and membership of, the Community was to coincide with the international 
recession caused by the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle-East. 
A further aspect of the historical factor as a fundamental 
influence on public attitudes might be said to be the different attitudes 
of politicians in the two countries to the European Community. After 
early opposition from the S.P.D. by the late 1950s, basically there 
was established a consensus in favour of membership on the part of 
West German politicians but this was not the case in Britain, where 
there was a confused situation with the Labour Party changing its mind 
on the issue. McLean points to the fact that the fluctuating opinion 
poll results in Britain over the years, prior to entry, with figures 
indicative of support appearing to have no pattern, were related to 
party choice. According to McLean, voters tended to share their opinion 
about the European Community with their chosen political party. As 
the Party's views changed so did their opinions too and, as a result, 
h . 4 their opinions on Europe were the consequences of their party c o1ce. 
Dissent was not just confined to the Labour Party stronghold. Initial 
Conservative opposition particularly amongst Members of Parliament 
and the farming community was strong but was to gradually weaken with 
the passage of time, in particular due to deflationary Government policy 
and the farmers took note of the European Price Agreements. 
' British public opinion polls in the 1960s reflected these changes. 
An August 1962 National Opinion Poll result produced a majority against 
joining the Community, however an opinion poll taken by O.R.C. in early 
1966 revealed that a substantive majority were in favour. 5 Probing 
questions revealed that the main reasons for wanting to join were 
economic and that many British people were distrustful of European 
countries. This contrasted very much with attitudes in Germany at 
the time, both public and political. The view had spread in West 
Germany that it was assumed that Britain would join the European 
Community and, increasingly, they were waiting for the entry of their 
British colleagues. German basic fundamental support for German 
membership of the Community was not under question as British member-
ship of the Community was in Britain, and Germans saw the entry of 
the British as being beneficial. 
It is important to consider the very different situations 
pertaining to each country's entry as a greater understanding of any 
differences in public attitude between 1975 to 1980 can be gained. 
National and individual circumstances have a distinct influence over 
public opinion: a time of prosperity may be said to induce a mood 
of greater optimism which will have a spill-over effect on attitudes 
to other issues. As economic decline or depression deepens, as it 
becomes harder to sell goods, for example, and jobs are threatened, 
then a tendency to blame external factors such as European Community 
membership develops. Germany entered the Community in the 1950s and 
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enjoyed years of European Community expansion and development. There 
was a mood of enthusiasm and optimism. In 1975 despite economic 
problems on the international front, German industry was not in a 
state of decline. British industry was not in such a happy position, 
however. Industrial dispute had been followed by political instability 
in the 1970s, (viz. the election, twice, of a minority Labour Government 
which was itself torn by factions with very di{ferent views). In Germany 
such problems at that time were not prevalent with a relatively high 
degree of political consensus especially on the economic front and 
international relations. This was not the case in Britain. The 1970s 
were a period of political polarisation, of serious economic problems 
including inflation and labour relations culminating in such events 
as the I.M.F. Loan and the Winter of Discontent. 
It was not a good time to become a new member of the European 
Community and Britain, in contrast to Germany, became increasingly 
one of the poorer members of the Community. Inglehart points to the 
quirk of the European Community financial syst~m which has meant tr~t, 
in spite of this situation, Britain, together with Germany, contributes 
more to the Community's finances than they receive. It was to become 
a bone of contention in Britain due to Britain subsidizing wealthier 
neighbours and it is important to bear this fact in mind when comparing 
public attitudes to the Community, for as a result, there was a growing 
tendency to put the blame for the difficult economic situation in the 
1970s on the Community. 6 It is also helpful when taking into considera-
tion whether membership had any effect on long-standing British attitudes 
to, for instance, other European countries. 
Finally, I would like to briefly discuss the role of opinion 
polls themselves as the main source of information throughout the 
thesis has been data obtained from survey research by the European 
Community and Opinion Poll organisations. Opinion polls themselves 
7 
first made their appearance in the United States of America just before 
the outbreak of the Second World War and after the War in the 1950s 
there was a demand for attitude surveys. They are therefore long-
established and are used by business and interest groups as well as 
political parties and organisations. Blumler and Fox point out that 
"surveys are sometimes described as providing photographic snapshots 
of a public's state of mind at a particular moment." 7 The Eurobarometer 
opinion polls are a system of regular surveys of attitudes using quota 
sampling in Britain and Germany, the quotas being established by sex, 
age and profession on the basis of census data. The same series of 
questions are asked in the European Community nations in order to 
obtain a systematic record of public opinion thereby facilitating a 
comparison of opinion. The data obtained from them forms the backbone 
of the thesis as it provides valuable information on "the thoughts, 
feelings, hopes and fears of Europeans on the entire spectrum of 
matters dealt with by the Community or likely to impinge on related 
concerns: the socio-political climate, attitudes to European unification 
and Community solidarity ••• " etc. 8 
According to Riffault and Rabier an international comparison 
is essential to a real understanding of opinions, attitudes and 
behaviour patterns in a given country and that international comparison 
is the key to understanding whether a given survey topic is viewed 
differently in country A or country a. 9 Certainly in considering 
British and German attitudes it is important to be able to compare 
the respective responses to like questions in order to establish whether 
similar or different attitudes prevail. It has been pointed out, however, 
that it is always difficult to assess public attitudes towards Europe 
because so much depends on how the questions themselves are actually 
framed and Blurnler and Fox recognise that " ..• true compatibility is 
not necessarily achieved by the adoption of identical question wordings 
8 
as respondent's interpretation of the same question may vary somewhat 
10 from one country to another." Nevertheless the wording of surveys 
is basically designed to tap people's general feeling of support or 
opposition to European issues and although they are not an absolute 
measure of support they do provide a very good idea of the levels of 
relative support in either nation especially where questions are uniform 
in a given year and over a period of years. Webb and Wybrow concur 
by arguing that there is an advantage in maintaining the precise form 
of the question in order that the true trend of public opinion can 
b db h d 1 . . f . 11 e measure y t e repeate app ~cat~on o ~t. 
They mention the fact that opinion polls for all their apparent 
or real faults, are here to stay and that they play an increasingly 
important part in the processes of informing the public and can sometimes 
lead to having an influence on matters of consequence. In their opinion, 
opinion pollsters put their skill and experience into the formulation 
of questions and questionnaires to produce the most meaningful and 
informative responses which should relate as much as possible to the 
true feelings and opinions of the respondents to the topic. 12 
There are limits to the reliability of opinion polls and attitude 
surveys but they do provide a valuable source of information and, as 
such, are a good guide to public opinion. Although much depends on 
how the results are interpreted, clear differences and similarities 
do emerge. The reputable organisations offer clear guide-lines to 
their interviewers for the carrying-out of surveys and, providing these 
are met, the findings offer a high degree of accuracy. The size of 
the sample is an important factor too. According to McLean, "if you 
k 1 . bl d. . n 13 have got a fair sample you can rna e a re ~a e pre ~ct~on. The 
one major factor which can affect the results of an opinion poll, or 
appear to produce a surprising result, is that of an outside influence, 
for instance a national or international event, and, throughout the 
9 
10 
thesis, I will take into account and seek to mention any such important 
developments which may or may not have had an effect on public opinion 
. l . 14 
at a part1cu ar t1me. 
Let me now turn my attention to the questions I will be considering 
throughout the thesis. Before I begin to discuss in detail the compara-
tive aspects of the public opinion in the two nations, Britain and 
Germany, I will outline the way in which the thesis will be divided. 
I will begin from the position that there were no major differences 
in the overall political and social attitudes between Britain and Germany 
whilst asking whether German opinion is in fact more united, (with 
a greater tendency towards consensus), than a more polarised British 
public? In the same vein I will also be considering whether German 
opinion is slightly more traditional in its attitudes on socio-political 
questions than the British. Secondly, it can be argued that in both 
Britain and Germany the public attitude to what one may call 'European 
Questions' is heavily influenced by perceptions of national interest 
and of national problems. British attitudes tend to focus on two material-
istic themes. There is the perception of negative benefits associated 
with British membership of the European Community in general and in 
terms of specific policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy and 
the Budget problems. Coupled with this is, however, the hope that 
Community policies might be devised which would deal with such British 
economic problems of inflation and unemployment, or that they will 
provide tangible benefits on the lines of regional aid. Both sets 
of attitudes will b~ analysed in detail to establish the depth of such 
conceptions. 
German opinion in contrast, which as I have already mentioned 
basically supports membership of the European Community and also further 
unification, appears to be grounded in the pragmatic perception of a 
satisfactory status quo: i.e. that the Community is producing general 
benefits for all its member States and also particular benefits for 
West Germany. An important factor which I will consider also is that 
there does not appear to be much 'European Idealism' in either Britain 
or Germany in the sense that neither seems to be prepared to accept 
significant sacrifices in the European cause. There is a high degree 
of general assent to rather vague pro-European sentiments when expressed 
in largely non-operable statements. British reservations tend to apply 
particularly whenever pro-European principles are explicitly stated 
which conflict with national independence and I will investigate 
whether there is in fact a greater British attachment to existing 
institutions and ideas of Nation-state than there is in Germany? 
Additionally, in both Germany and Britain there is a clear contrast 
between the attitudes and actions of the public when it comes to 
European matters, for example comparing the .intention to vote in the 
1979 European Parliamentary Elections and the actual voting behaviour 
which took place. There is a considerable degree of similarity in 
public attitudes to trust in other countries and to potential new 
members in the two nations with, noticeably, a North European bias 
emerging. When this area of interest is subsequently covered in the 
thesis, I will take into consideration the possibility that any 
differences could be explained by reference to the national policy 
and individual experiences of Britain and Germany, for example, anti-
United States of America sentiment in Britain. 
Turning to other important factors, it will be necessary to 
distinguish at the European level between general attitudes versus 
tangible actions. It will be interesting to see what findings do 
emerge when these factors are analysed. Linked to this is a consideration 
of whether in fact there have been any longitudinal changes in attitudes 
and whether these changes were general? Also one must not forget the 
possibility of fluctuations in attitudes which could be associated 
11 
with specific events such as the 1975 British Referendum on European 
Community membership and the 1979 European Parliamentary Elections 
and any findings pertaining to these possibilities will be duly brought 
to the readers' attention. Finally special attention will be taken 
of the influence or otherwise of the Media, looking at how satisfied 
the public in both nations was with the available information and 
sources of information and whether there is any significant contrast 
between the two. The 1975 British Referendum and the 1979 European 
Elections will also be covered as separate events. 
12 
The various themes which I have been detailing for consideration 
constitute specific points which offer a good insight into the comparative 
attitudes of the two nations. One cannot look at one area in isolation 
or merely consider a factor such as attitudes to membership of the 
Community and to further integration of the Community without establishing, 
for example, whether both share similar likes and dislikes in terms 
of trust in other nations. The theme of 'nationalism' in relation 
to the Community appears to emerge again and again and how deep the 
public attitude on this issue is may or may not be seen to have a bearing 
on attitudes to the development of the Community or to other aspects 
of membership of the Community. Is one country going to emerge as 
more forward-looking, the other more static in its hopes and aspirations? 
It may seem that too much attention is being paid to the socio-
political aspects in relation to public attitudes but it is important 
to take into consideration such aspects as the 'Happiness Factor' as 
these may well have a substantial bearing in general on attitudes towards 
the European Community itself and Community activities. Noticeably 
'anti-Europe' attitudes prevalent at a specific time may well relate 
to developments taking place in the home country. Such factors also can 
explain a marked contrast in attitudes and may well determine curious 
gender-related differences which may emerge in public attitudes. 
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Chapter 1 
SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
I shall now enter into a brief discussion of socio-political 
attitudes in the two nations. For the purpose of the thesis I will 
make a selective comparison, taking one or two chosen areas as examples. 
These attitudes may have relevance in the later stages of the thesis. 
Amongst the areas to be covered are happiness and a personal sense of 
well-being and a personal involvement in informal politics. 
Turning first to the 'Happiness Factor', a European Commission 
sponsored poll in 1975 saw Germany placed in eighth position and the 
British in fifth position out of a list of the nine European Community 
member countries in terms of the 'Very Happy' response, the ratio 
being 22% to 11% in Britain's favour. 1 British women emerged as 
consistently happiest, {approx. 25%), comparing Britain and Germany, 
2 
when both sexes and all age groups were compared. This is interesting 
as happiness could have a marked bearing on attitudes noticeably as 
the feeling of happiness is often closely linked with personal aspects 
of life as lived in a particular culture. A different question, this 
time concerning feelings of well-being, that of achievement of hopes, 
was one of the subjects considered in 1978. Whereas most {50%+) German 
men and women felt that they had achieved the things that they hoped 
for, in general, most British men and women responded that they had 
had to be content with less. 3 Thus, in 1975 the British were happier 
in terms of general happiness but in 1978 they felt that they were 
not achieving their hopes which was something of a peculiarity. 
Firstly, however, one must not forget that although related, 
these were two different questions and the findings could be open to 
different interpretation. The situation could have changed with people 
feeling less happy by 1978 - a longitudinal change perhaps? Or maybe 
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it was a question of measuring something quite different. Could one 
argue that German people were more pessimistic in their outlook than 
the British, perhaps having lower expectations of life thus more likely 
to achieve their hopes? We now come to people's personal involvement 
in politics considering such issues as the propensity to discuss politics, 
whether people felt able to exert a socio-political influence, membership 
of social organisations and so on. A 1975 European Commission poll 
into the propensity to frequently discuss politics revealed that in 
both Germany and Britain, age made a difference amongst the men, in 
that it was the younger man who talked least often about politics. 
A minority in either country responded that they discussed politics 
often, the largest minority group being men over the age of 25 (a third-
plus, slightly more-so amongst German men). Women of both nations, 
plus young men, were distinctly less inclined to discuss politics and 
the propensity to discuss politics often was clearly linked to the 
1 1 f d . . d4 eve o e ucat1on atta1ne . 
In 1978 a survey was made into the frequency of political 
discussion amongst friends comparing Spring 1975 and Autumn 1977. 
The Germans increasingly (up to 60%) over the years stated that they 
discussed politics occasionally as did most (up to 50%+) British men; 
it was only British women who were divided and increasingly inclined 
to respond 'never·'. 5 British women also gave the most negative response 
in surveys between 1975 and 1977 which looked at whether people felt 
capable of persuading others. There was disillusionment in both 
nations however with a growing 'rarely' response from German women 
and division amongst British men. Only amongst German men was there 
some indication of feeling able to persuade others occasionally (45%). 6 
An earlier survey carried out in 1975 into whether people felt able 
to exert a socio-political influence perhaps reflected the differences 
between the nations and the sexes even more. Most British men remained 
consistently supportive of the idea that they could exert a socio-
political influence in contrast to everyone else; there was a distinct 
contrast in Germany where age was an important factor. Amongst men, 
confidence grew with age (up to 41%) whereas amongst women, confidence 
declined with age (down to 24%). British women were more confident 
when younger; it was only amongst older (over 55) British women that 
confidence declined (to 27%). 7 
Bearing in mind the higher British response in 1975 it will be 
important to note whether these subtle personal differences in the 
socio-political arena might have had an important influence on external 
political European Community attitudes and I will take careful cognisance 
of levels of doubt occurring in years where personal disillusionment 
was evident. I would like now to discuss briefly participation in 
social organisations as some quite distinct cultural contrasts emerged, 
perhaps reflecting important differences in the social climate and 
social influences, (also perhaps political influences) in the two 
nations. 
A 1978 survey into membership of, and participation in, social 
organisations revealed that men more so than women were members, 
German women being the least interested, and of those people who were 
active participants, British men were slightly more active members 
8 
than German men. Amongst those women who did participate, British 
women were more active members. Differences are reflected in Table 1 
detailing the first three choices. 
The religious influence on German society was evident and was 
clearly one of the clearest contrasts between the two nations. German 
men, as well as German women, were involved in Religious societies. 
Looking at the political arena, the two main Churches in Germany, the 
Catholic and Lutheran Protestant Churches enjoyed some political 
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BRITAIN: 
Men 
Trade Unions or 
Professional Societies 
Sporting Clubs or 
Societies 
Educational/Artistic or 
Cultural Societies 
GERMANY: 
Men 
Sporting Clubs of 
Societies 
Trade Unions or 
Professional Societies 
Religious or 
Philosophical Societies 
TABLE 1 
Women 
Educational, Artistic or 
Cultural Societies 
Others (i.e. Non-political/ 
17 
social action/religious etc.) 
Sporting Clubs or Societies 
Women 
Religious or 
Philosophical Societies 
Sporting Clubs or 
Societies 
Educational/Artistic or 
Cultural Societies 
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influence and in some States there was a religious divide: for 
example, in Bavaria which was predominantly Catholic, people voted 
for the C.S.U. Party which was attached to the Conservative C.D.U. 
Party. One therefore has to consider the question of religious influence 
on political and social attitudes to the Community. Could there be, 
perhaps, a correlation between a more 'conservative' or 'traditional' 
attitude to life and politics, reflected in both sexes in Germany which 
could explain discrepancies in attitudes between Germany and Britain? 
The religious situation in Britain was different. The churches, 
especially in England, had lost th~dr social and political influence, 
(declining church attendance being an example, though Scottish attendance 
was higher). Apart ~rom the case of Northern Ireland where religion 
and politics did mix, the religious influence on the main political 
parties was not as evident, nor as clear-cut as in Germany. Methodism, 
too, was no longer the mainstay of the British Labour Party, for example. 
One fundamental difference was that in Germany there was a compulsory 
Church tax still being levied which most Germans chose to comply with. 
Thus religion was clearly continuing to play an important part in 
German lives with funds available for religious-based organisations. 
The second clear contrast between the two nations was the higher 
membership by British women of 'Other Organisations', a term perhaps 
covering such institutions as 'The Women's Institute' and the 'Townswomen's 
Guild'. It is worth noting as it had already been revealed that British 
women showed least propensity to discuss politics amongst their friends 
/ 
and perhaps this finding revealed a subtle difference in social behaviour 
amongst the women of Germany and Britain. These findings now beg the 
question of whether indeed German people could be considered to be 
more traditional in their attitudes in comparison with the British. 
I will take as an example a comparison of attitudes to the involvement 
of women in local government and in national parliamentary politics 
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in both nations; also women's participation in the European Elections. 
Such findings could prove to be relevant in the specifically European 
context. A survey into whether people considered politics to be more 
of a man's business in 1975 revealed fundamental differences in attitudes. 
Around 70% of British men and women rejected the idea of politics being 
a man's business but in Germany division prevailed with German men 
being mostly in favour, (51% with 46% opposed}, whereas 51% of German 
women were opposed and 42% in favour. Perhaps attitudes were changing 
in Germany but there was still strong support for old-established ideas. 9 
A 1975 survey into the respective political roles that men and women 
should play perhaps revealed the influence of the age factor in Germany 
in terms of social attitudes to change, for only men and women over 
the age of 55 objected to women playing the same role, men more than 
women expressing a more conservative desire for men and women to play 
different roles. In Britain there was high support for men and women 
to play the same role in all ages, apart from a distinctly lower level 
10 
of support_amongst older (55+} women. It is important to note this 
anomaly as clearly in Britain the age factor was somewhat different 
as indeed the highest support for men and women playing the same role 
came from the oldest age group amongst British men. One wonders if 
the level of education amongst older people in Germany might have 
played a part as the higher the level of education attained the greater 
the level of support for the same role concept existed amongst everyone 
apart from those with average education in Germany. This is linked 
to whether p·eople believed politics was a man's business and perhaps 
was an indictment of differences in terms of age in social and political 
attitudes. One must bear in mind that the education of many older 
people or the lives they led was not that of people brought up post-
war and may reflect into their attitudes towards, for example, European 
integration. 
I will now consider attitudes to men and women participating 
in politics in both nations. A survey into confidence in a man or 
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woman as Member of Parliament (comparing 1975 and 1977) produced fundamental 
differences both between nationalities and sexes perhaps emphasising 
how complicated attitudes became when specific matters were under 
consideration. Over 50% of German men had more confidence in a man 
although 40% said neither the one nor the other. Amongst British men 
who, initially, were more liberal in that over 50% in 1975 also said 
that there was no difference, by 1977, 48% had more confidence in a 
man. German women believed that there was no difference but British 
women seemed to experience a crisis of confidence as, like their men, 
they believed initially there was no difference then became more divided. 11 
These findings, it is interesting to note, followed the coming into 
force in Britain (in December 1975) of the Sex Discrimination and Equal 
Pay Acts and it has been noted that by 1975 British people were expressing 
some dissatisfaction with life by stating that they felt that they 
were not achieving their hopes. There were also problems with the 
British economy and a difficult political situation. Could one therefore 
expect a correlation between a crisis of confidence amongst the British 
who, one must not forget, chose to remain in the Community out of a 
belief that they would gain economic benefit from Community membership, 
and disillusionment with the European Community as life became harder 
at home? In later stages of the thesis I will draw out other signs 
which might indicate such a crisis of confidence especially if they 
appear to coincide with lack of support for Community membership. 
A further example of traditional attitudes was revealed in a 
1977 survey where German men and women favoured a more traditional 
attitude that people prefer to vote for a man whereas in Britain the 
major criticism was that too few women offered themselves as candidates 
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(although a third of British men did support the German viewpoint). 
But perhaps one could also detect a sign of dissatisfaction ih Germany 
in that both sexes did respond that they thought the male candidates 
b f h . . 12 h. . got etter support rom t e1r part1es. T 1s rece1ved little acknowledge-
ment in Britain but there was an element of discord in Britain between 
the sexes on attitudes towards the situation which would arise if more 
women were elected to Parliament as British men were very divided, 
coming down slightly more (35%) in support of the belief that things 
would remain the same, in contrast to 48% of British women who believed 
that things would go better. The German position leaned towards support 
for the status-quo, 45% of women and 52% of men expecting things to 
. h 13 rema1n t e same. 
What therefore did people expect would actually happen if more 
women were elected? The same survey posed this question and found 
that German people were rather more definite in their replies than 
were the British. There was far more unity in Germany percentage-wise 
in the responses, the greatest division being over the belief that 
the problems of women would get more serious attention, German women 
clearly having higher expectations than their men. British men and 
women were more divided over every suggestion apart from expecting 
that neglected problems would be discussed for the first time; British 
women too expected women's problems to get more serious attention than 
d . d h . 14 1 t e1r men. With the advent of the forthcoming first direct 
elections to the European Parliament (in 1979) people were also asked 
in 1977 whether they supported the idea of quite a lot of women being 
elected to the European Parliament. One interviewee in four did not 
reply, but of those who did, British women were most in favour (60%); 
51% of German women and a higher percentage of British men (45% with 
36% opposed) also concurred. German men were the most divided of a11. 15 
A high level of 'Don't Knows' were recorded in Germany which makes 
one wonder if there was some apathy over European issues in Germany 
whereas the British were still more inclined to question European 
developments, knowing that they had only recently (in 1975) decided 
to retain their membership. 
The German position on what would happen if more women were in 
local councils mirrored that of their expectations for greater partici-
pation of women in Parliament with a response in favour of the status 
quo, (44% for 'better'), but whereas British men had been divided over 
women's participation in Parliament, 43% of British men responded in 
16 favour of the status quo. 
There is one final comparison I would like to make of the socio-
political attitudes of British and German people and that is in their 
expectations of the functions and behaviour of their respective 
national governments and MembersofParliament, allowing for the 
very different systems of national government prevailing in both nations. 
Firstly, respondents in the two nations had different attitudes as 
to what was the most important function of their national parliaments 
as was revealed in a 1977 survey. The most important function for 
British respondents was for control of the spending of public money 
(64%), whereas in Germany almost equal priority was given to national 
parliaments watching over, supporting or opposing the government (47%) 
and to the proposal, discussion and passing of laws (43%). 17 Secondly, 
a different response was also elicited over the most important function 
of national M.P.s, the German response favouring M.P.s helping solve 
the problems of individual citizens, whereas, although this was 
supported by 35% of British people, they gave priority to M.P.s taking 
part in parliamentary debates and to asking questions on the actions 
18 
of the government. I will look at attitudes to the actual role of 
national parliaments at a slightly later stage in the thesis when I 
turn to the issue of European unification. 
22 
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In conclusion it is possible to discern adherence to 'traditional' 
long-standing attitudes to socio-political matters in both nations 
although quite naturally not necessarily to the same things. Indeed, 
British men, initially quite liberal in certain areas actually appeared 
to express less liberal viewpoints as time progressed. In terms of 
attitudes to the European Community it became clear that external 
factors such as the economic situation and, in Germany's case, the 
role of religion might have some effect on socio-political attitudes 
and therefore also play a part in shaping attitudes to Community issues. 
There were signs of change in a more liberal direction, to a certain 
extent, in Germany, on certain socio-political fronts but there was 
attachment to the status quo which questioned the propensity to accept 
change in a European Community context. However, in Britain, as life 
became harder, British men especially, were less inclined to accept 
change in particular where political influence was greatest. This 
might indicate a level of self-centredness or instrumentalism in 
attitudes as both British men and women did appear to support issues 
where they felt that they might benefit and it would not be unreasonable 
to assume that this will be discernible in the European context also. 
Did this also apply, I wonder, to Germany too? 
24 
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Chapter 2 
MEMBERSHIP, COMMUNITY IMAGES AND PROBLEMS 
Having discussed differences in socio-political attitudes in 
Germany and Britain I will now begin to undertake a comparison of the 
two nations' attitudes to the European Community itself. In the 
Introduction to the thesis I pointed out that German opinion had been 
basically in favour of membership, in contrast to Britain. According 
to a Eurobarometer opinion poll published in 1980 with findings for 
the years 1975-1980, a pattern emerged of fluctuations in Britain, 
with decreasing (under 50%) support. There was only one discrepancy 
in Germany, a drop to 48% support for Community membership in Spring 
1976, normal support being over 50%. 1 Blumler and Fox, commenting 
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on membership support noted that Germany, with one exeption, consistently 
recorded majorities in favour of membership yielding average support 
levels close to 60% and, with the 1976 exception, opponents never 
exceeded 10% of those interviewed. Indeed outright opposition to 
membership showed signs of waning in pre-European Election surveys. 
In Britain they noted that support for membership was much lower, 
attitudes were more or less enduringly polarised and that one in three 
respondents felt that membership was beneficial for Britain, one in 
three remained unconvinced and one in three were more decidedly opposed 
h . 2 to t e Commun~ty. Butler in discussing the Referendum said that people 
who had been in a 'No' mood previously, noted 'Yes' largely because 
those political leaders whom they most respected vigorously urged them 
to do so which introduces the concept of volatility in British attitudes. 3 
It also brings out a point I expressed in discussing socio-political 
attitudes that external factors such as party-political persuasion 
could have a direct effect on public opinion. One had a clear example 
of the personal attitude and influence of national politicians having 
a direct influence on attitudes to the Community. There were bumps 
in support in both Germany and Britain for, as Handley pointed out, 
it appears that " .•. whensaliency of European affairs is increased by 
such events as election campaigns, publics tend to become more 
supportive of the European unity ideal." 4 However, the basic difference 
between the two was the continuing support in Germany in contrast to 
increasing disillusionment in Britain. 
There was an interesting anomaly, however, in that when Eurobarometer 
surveys in 1977 and 1978 investigated opinions on membership in vaguer 
terms of in ten to fifteen years in the future, there was a notable 
increase in support in Britain, the British offering an almost 50% 
response to the Community being a good thing. 5 And in surveys into 
scrapping the Community the British response was mainly sorry or 
indifferent, (with a quarter relieved), whilst the Germans mainly 
6 declared that they would be sorry. 
As I have previously referred to in socio-political attitudes 
the British scored higher in a 1975 'Happiness' table and indeed a 
Eurobarometer survey which looked at happiness throughout the years 
1975 to 1979 revealed that over 50% of people in both nations declared 
themselves to be fairly happy. 7 Indeed a survey into overall life 
satisfaction resulted in figures showing 80% or more in Britain 
declaring themselves basically satisfied with the lives they were 
leading. In Germany they were slightly less satisfied. 8 Therefore 
it is clear that support for the Community was not completely linked 
with general well-being and that other factors must have been playing 
a substantial part. This high degree of satisfaction, however, might 
have been one reason for the more positive viewpoint of the British 
towards Community membership in future terms as possibly they still 
retained a basic optimism which was reflected in such findings. 
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When it came to rather more specific questions on Community issues, 
varying attitudes between Britain and Germany did emerge. Inglehart, 
in a study including the years 1975-1980, made the point that " ... in 
their hearts the British are as European as [other nations] - but there 
is a widespread perception that British economic interests were not 
well served by membership in the Community." The problems over the 
British contribution to the Community budget and, according to Inglehart, 
a tendency to place some of the blame on the European Community institu-
tions could not help but encourage a more negative perceived stance 
.. h 9 amongst the Br1t1s • It was not entirely a one-sided view for a Euro-
barometer survey made at the end of 1978 saw neither nation saying 
that their country had benefitted more by being members of the Community. 
The British clearly were very dissatisfied with 49% believing that 
they had benefitted less and the Germans were very divided with only 
a fifth saying that they had indeed benefitted more compared with other 
. . 10 Commun1ty countr1es. 
British pessimism had been quite evident when people were asked 
in 1976 to attribute the effects of the Common Market on their jobs, 
the country's economy, consumer prices and underdeveloped areas in 
their country. Apart from responding that there had been no effect 
at all on their or their spouses job or profession, the British 
responded that there had been a bad effect and many also were very 
divided over the benefits or otherwise of the Common Market on under-
developed areas. But the German response had not been much happier 
either, for, apart from believing the Community had had a positive 
effect on the German economy and no effect at all in terms of work, 
Germans were unhappy at the effect of the Community on prices and were 
11 divided as to whether there had been any effect on underdeveloped areas. 
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It would appear that it was not therefore the British alone 
who were liable to complain about the effect of the Community on 
domestic matters such as prices. 
I would like at this point to compare the different impressions 
and images of the Community in both nations. A Eurobarometer survey 
in Autumn 1975 offered a comprehensive list of images for people 
to agree or disagree with and the findings did reveal certain subtle 
d . f . d 12 1f erences 1n attitu es. (see Table 2) 
The most striking impression gained from these findings was the 
high degree of division in Britain barely a few months after the 
majority vote to retain Community membership in the British Referendum, 
the consensus appearing to be motivated in a more negative direction. 
The Germans in contrast enjoyed, apart from one instance, where there 
was some division, a favourable impression of the Community. Dalton 
and Duval possibly offer an explanation for this phenomenon. They 
argue that citizens' opinions are susceptible to change and point out 
that although public opinion in Britain in January 1975 had been mostly 
negative, a large proportion of the electorate had been uncommitted. 
Following the treaty renegotiations, public opinion had turned in favour 
of continued membership, but after the Referendum favourable opinion 
had slowly declined. 13 Following the Referendum the balance of Community-
related news became steadily more negative and one might well understand 
that a return to a more negative attitude amongst the British public 
was feasible; a return to 'normality' following the hiatus of the 
Referendum campaign bringing with it a return of British scepticism. 
In the section on socio-political attitudes I introduced the idea 
of instrumental attitudes on the part of the British public and I would 
like to bring this theme now into the sphere of European Community 
benefits and also question the assumption that it might only apply 
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TABLE 2 
BRITAIN GERMANY 
The Common Market provides a 60% (Agree) 85% (Agree) 
wider choice of goods for 
consumers. 28% (Disagree) 9% (Disagree) 
The Common Market facilitates 42% (Agree) 82% (Agree) 
the sale of industrial 
products abroad and helps 36% (Disagree) 4% (Disagree) 
to develop national 
production. 
The Common Market stimulates 41% (Agree) 72% (Agree) 
industrial development. 
36% (Disagree) 15% (Disagree) 
The Common Market facilitates -- --3 n -(Agree ) -- - -- --13% (Agree) 
the sale of agricultural 
products abroad. 38% (Disagree) 15% (Disagree) 
The Common Market curbs price 23% (Agree) 43% (Agree) 
rises by increasing 
competition. 59% (Disagree) 34% (Disagree) 
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to British attitudes. Butler also seems to hint at the likelihood 
of instrumentalism in British attitudes when he discusses the forces 
prevalent in 1975. Persuasive arguments with the depressing theme 
of no alternative to Community membership - what for instance was the 
alternative? - clearly had had an influence on attitudes prior to the 
14 Referendum. The end of days of Empire and years of economic struggle 
outside of the Community whilst watching member States benefit from 
membership had not conjured up a positive outlook of alternatives to 
Community membership in British eyes. But a vote in favour had been 
made with a desire for gains from Community membership and not out 
of a great desire for European integration and these attitudes were 
reflected in an opinion poll taken after the Referendum in Autumn 1975 
which looked at the importance attached to problems the Community was 
kl . 15 tac ~ng. Both nations considered the problems being dealt with 
by the Community to be important, the British more so than the Germans. 
The following problems were considered important by both:-
* Reducing the differences between the developed and less-
developed regions of the Community. 
* A common fight against rising prices. 
* Co-ordinating the social policies of the member countries 
in the fields of employment and job training. 
* Implementation of a common policy on energy supplies. 
* Modernisation of European agriculture. 
* Introduction of a common policy for protecting Nature 
and fighting pollution. 
* Protection of consumers against fraudulent selling and 
misleading advertising. 
* Achieving a common Foreign Policy in discussions with 
the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. 
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There was a desire in both nations for protection of and support 
for Community action which would have a direct perceived beneficial 
effect on life in the home country. One problem, for example, rated 
especially important by the British was that of the modernisation of 
agriculture which was a live political issue in Britain relating to 
the view of foreign agriculture being a drain on British resources. 
Two problems which brought division in both nations did question 
the extent to which even Germany was prepared to go in the interests 
of the Community at the expense of herself. They were:-
* Replacing the currencies of member countries with a 
single European currency. 
* Introduction of a common policy on aid to under-
developed countries outside of the Community. 
These two problems would involve, on the one hand, actual change in 
a fundamental part of the national way of life and, on the other, 
specific financial assistance by Germany and Britain, both of whom 
were the greatest contributors to the Community Budget which was a 
major source of disagreement in Britain. It was an early indication 
of the unwillingness on the part of either country to become involved 
in direct action on behalf of others where it might involve some element 
of sacrifice. According to Inglehart and Rabier " ••• the formation 
of a European outlook is something which develops rather slowly ... " 
and it is interesting to note that although Germany clearly was more 
supportive of the Community after over twenty years of membership, 
there were some hiccoughs in attitudes when no direct personal benefit 
16 for the country could be seen. A further Eurobarometer survey made 
in 1976 into attitudes to problems people were interested in, reinforced 
the assumptions I have made. Certain questions were similar and produced 
. . d 17 
no change 1n att1tu es. Notably, the importance of the problem of 
rising prices, protection of consumers and protection of nature. 
A question linked to a common foreign policy, that of defending our 
interests against the Superpowers also produced a response that this 
was important to both. The British appeared to have come to terms 
with their changed political role on the world stage to some extent, 
since the Second World War, and were possibly looking to new alliances 
in order to protect themselves. The Germans too felt qneasy as Germany 
was within direct range of the Warsaw Pact countries. The question 
of these being inherently selfish attitudes on their part is, of 
course, true in that neither ranked the problems as being unimportant 
due to the perceived benefits of such policies by the Community. Other 
questions were posed and there were similarities in attitudes with 
the following also rated as important by both:-
* To try to reduce the number of very rich and very 
poor people. 
* Provide for sufficient housing. 
* Fighting unemployment. 
* Modernise education to meet today's needs. 
When membership of the Community was considered in vague terms 
as I mentioned earlier there was acceptance and support in Britain 
as well as in Germany and one could also see that vague concepts such 
as reducing the numbers of rich and poor people received a favourable 
response. Community problems which could offer help to inherent 
national social issues such as unemployment clearly also found favour. 
But one problem which had registered support in 1975, that of reducing 
the differences between regions, had assumed greater importance in 
British eyes but had declined in importance in Germany and there was 
a difference of opinion over the Community controlling the activities 
of the multinational or international firms. Germany considering it 
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an important problem, the British being divided; neither considered 
more self-government for the regions to be important. One Community 
problem, that of strengthening our military defence against possible 
enemies which could have involved direct Community involvement in 
British defence strategy, not just being confined to the sphere of 
international debate on defence and alliances, was seen as being 
important in Britain but there was division in Germany where most 
people thought it an unimportant problem. The defence situation in 
Germany was very different to that of the British, severe restrictions 
having been placed on German defence capacity after the Second World 
War by the Allied Powers whereas the question of independent defence 
capacity was seen as being important by most politicians in Britain 
and the public as well. 
Spring 1976 as I have already mentioned had seen a decline in 
support for the Community in Germany and it also coincided with the 
destabilisation of the European currencies due to French withdrawal 
from the European Currency 'Snake'. Rabier and Inglehart, in studies 
they have made into public appraisals of Community membership, have 
found that economic conditions do seem to have a significant impact 
and that their results support the idea that favourable outputs tend 
to enhance support for membership in a political community, while 
unfavourable ones have the opposite effect, in a loose way. Although 
they point out that the recession and inflation of the 1970s were 
worldwide phenomena which were probably only marginally affected by 
European Community institutions' actions, the publics concerned did 
seem to attribute prevailing economic conditions to their membership 
0 0 18 1n the Commun1ty. 
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Chapter 3 
BACKGROUND FACTORS RELATING TO 
EXPECTED BENEFITS OF MEMBERSHIP 
I should like, at this point in the thesis, to discuss 
certain factors related to expected benefits of Community member-
ship before turning to consider specific attitudes towards the 
unification of Europe. Although I noted a tendency on the part 
of the British to consider the Community more favourably in 
future terms there were grievances. However, such grievances 
were not solely a British prerogative, Germans also sharing many 
British attitudes to images of the Community and the problems 
being tackled by the Community. In addition, where certain 
differences such as in the field of social priorities emerged, 
one could see that in both countries attitudes were being influenced 
by external factors. Over twenty years of membership had not 
prevented Germans from taking a narrow view of Community issues 
if there was felt to be some effect on the internal situation of 
Germany herself. It may be important to consider whether attitudes 
were being affected by such factors as basic attitudes to democracy 
and to the system of government itself. 
I have already briefly mentioned the cost of living but I 
would also like to analyse this factor a little deeper. Depressed 
attitudes to membership of the Community might have been linked 
to perceptions of living standards since entering the Community 
and as it has already been stated by observers of public attitudes, 
social factors can have an unfortunate impact on attitudes to the 
Community. The implications for attitudes to European integration 
must therefore be borne in mind. 
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In the Introduction, in addition to referring to the possibility 
of a perception of negative benefits of Community membership by the 
British, I also questioped whether there was a greater attachment 
to the Nation-state amongst the British and I shall analyse this 
factor as it might be argued that where a great attachment to national 
institutions existed one could therefore expect a slightly cool approach 
to the concept of further European integration. It might prove to 
be that both nations displayed such attachment for, (it has been said), 
Germany under Chancellor Schmidt's leadership was displaying more 
t 0 10 0 d 0 l na lona lStlc ten encles. 
As I stated earlier, a Eurobarometer survey had revealed that 
the British had declared themselves to be slightly m·ore satisfied 
with life than had the Germans, but were they also as satisfied with 
democracy and were there fundamental differences in their basic 
attitudes to society? The Community was after all a group of countries 
with different political systems but for further European integration 
to take place perhaps one might suggest that there should be at least 
some basic fundamental political attitudes with which to establish 
some sort of base. If there were differences perhaps they might 
give an insight into British criticism of Community membership also. 
At first glance it might have appeared that in fact both countries 
thought alike as Eurobarometer surveys taken between 1976 and 1980 
revea!ed satisfaction with democracy. However, the degree of satis-
faction was in fact very different, over 70% - up to 80% of Germans 
declaring themselves to be satisfied whereas the British figures 
fluctuated between 51% and a maximum of 62%. 2 A contradiction emerged 
for the high point of British satisfaction with democracy was in 
1978, a time when British citizens had declared themselves to be 
dissatisfied with the achievement of their hopes and also a time 
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of political instability at horne. The main worry concerned fighting 
rising prices, (reflected in the list of social priorities for 1977), 
but maintenance of law and order had figured highly although by 1980 
the number citing this declined significantly. But unlike in Germany 
where no worry about giving the people more say in government decisions 
had been evident between 1977 and 1980, this became a matter of 
increasing importance to the British. 
These years which had included some co-habitation between the 
Labour and Liberal Parties in government had perhaps resulted in 
doubts about the political system in Britain. Yet if the Germans 
appeared happier with democracy than did the British they were revealed 
to be very divided when surveys were made between 1976 and 1980 into 
three basic attitudes to society: reforms, defence against subversion 
and revolutionary action. There was no difference between them over 
the order of priority in which they placed these basic attitudes. 
In neither Germany nor Britain was there much regard for revolutionary 
action but the British were quite clear in their minds that they 
considered reforms to be the major priority, (between 54% and 67%), 
with just 21% to 32% for defence against subversion. Germans had 
some difficulty in deciding which was the most important, with 
percentages of between 41% and 50% registered for each. 3 
At a time when the British were most satisfied with democracy, 
the Germans were most worried about defence against subversion yet 
declared themselves very happy with democracy. That there might be 
some people in Germany who were not as happy with democracy and the 
political system as it appeared was brought out in a study of Germany 
and the German people by Conradt. He drew out the fact that in a 1978 
nation-wide survey those Germans conceiving democracy to be a system 
with frequent extensive and direct citizen involvement in decision-
making perceived Germany to be falling short and those who identified 
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democracy with economic equality and worker co-determination were also 
not satisfied. More Germans saw democracy in procedural terms, (free 
elections, competitive parties, etc.), and were quite content with 
Germany's accomplishments. But he does make the point that there is 
a difference between the ideal and the reality of democracy and that 
although there was a high degree of consensus, the consensus dropped 
4 
sharply over permitting tolerance of political extremists, for example. 
As I stated at the start of this section of the thesis, common 
attitudes to democracy, society and perhaps, linked to that, state 
security, would need to develop before real European integration could 
have a chance of success. Both Germany and Britain appeared not 
entirely satisfied with certain aspects of their own society; would 
they therefore contemplate further integration on a whole-hearted 
basis? Whilst seeking to answer that question, however, I would like 
to bring into the discussion other background factors which might also 
have influenced public opinion. The British, as I have reiterated, 
were increasingly dissatisfied with their membership of the Community 
since the 1975 Referendum, a finding revealed by opinion polls other 
than the Eurobarometer surveys. An N.O.P. Draft Press Release gave 
details of surveys into British opinion on Community membership and 
revealed that there was a clear swing against membership, (down to 
35% for those saying they would vote 'Yes' in a referendum on membership) 
and also showed that Gallup findings too revealed declining support 
in 1976. 5 Marquand offers a further insight into this drop in support 
by arguing that the Community process was depicted to the British 
people, 
.•. as an endless struggle between a collection of selfish 
continentals, trying to screw the last farthing out of the 
British Government, and gallant British ministers, saving 
their country from exploitation only by using all their 
teeth and claws .•• 
As he adds in conclusion, " ••. it was not a good way to persuade people 
that membership of the Community was desirable." 6 Marquand does point 
out that consensus in the foreign policy field had not always existed 
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in Germany but Germany, anxious for international acceptance and respect-
ability, had been eager to join the Community in order to be locked 
into the Western World, hence perhaps the high support for Community 
membership amongst the German public. 7 However, as I have indicated, 
German self-interest was evident when the question of helping another 
Community member country had been raised and indeed Morgan, when 
analysing attitudes in Germany to the effects on the Community of the 
entry of Greece, Spain and Portugal, stated that this enlargement was 
seen as contributing to the economic goal of maintaining the prosperity 
of Germany and her partners and enhancing Germany's and Europe's security. 
There was a guarded proviso that there were limits to the price which 
Germany was prepared to pay for such desirable objectives. 8 It was 
clear that economics were important to both nations which leads me 
to question the satisfaction in both nations over living standards 
and the general situation in their countries between 1975 and 1980. 
They were apparently satisfied with life in general, though the British 
expressed disappointment over achievement of their hopes. Conservatism 
was growing in some socio-political areas especially amongst British 
men as life appeared to be getting worse economically and this was 
evident in general in Germany. Further European integration, one might 
expect, would require some willingness to accept change and it might 
be reasonable to suggest that negative perceptions of change in terms 
of the home country and in Britain's case especially in the light of 
recent membership, could not auger well for such integration. So how 
happy were both nations with their living standards? Various Euro-
barometer polls posed questions directly seeking a response to this 
issue over the years and the findings revealed some contrariness on 
the part of the British who, in spite of continuous criticism of 
membership of the Community, did appear to grow more optimistic about 
their living standards for a time. In 1975 over 80% of those polled 
said that their assessment of the general situation in Britain 
compared with four or five years ago was that things had got worse, 
yet two years later, when one would have expected people to be very 
unhappy over living standards as inflation and national government 
instability were prominent, the prevailing mood was optimism with 
65% expecting an improvement in living standards over the next five 
years. Three years later, however, the British were rather more 
undecided, 39% believing living standards were declining though over 
a third were still optimistic and just under a third favoured the 
9 
status quo. It may be that these somewhat contradictory views reflect 
the difficulties people experience in assessing their situation in 
an inflationary period. Perhaps one could suggest that 1977 was a 
sort of watershed and that as the difficulties in negotiations with 
other Community countries grew and the internal economic and political 
strains began to bite from then on British optimism began to decline. 
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I referred to the fact that there had been a growth in desire to maintain 
the status quo by 1978, particularly amongst British men, and disappoint-
ment over hopes apparent in spite of people declaring themselves fairly 
happy and generally satisfied with life. By 1978 Britain was involved 
in several disputes with Community members and it was difficult to 
see how people could be expected to maintain a positive outlook especially 
as they had decided to remain in the Community for economic reasons 
and benefits they did not feel were being realised. Perhaps one should 
divide British attitudes into two periods, 1975-1977 and 1977-1980? 
Was the latter period a time when the British decided the honeymoon 
with the Community was finally over and that they had begun to feel 
that they had been short-changed? One must remember that 1977 was 
also the year in which the transitional period of membership finally 
ended and Britain became a full member of the Community customs union. 
From then on the situation politically could not be the same and it 
was unfortunate that the years which followed were torn with internal 
strife as well as inter-Community wrangles. The international scene 
was also very difficult with the economic crisis growing globally; 
it was therefore far easier to absorb the pessimistic picture which 
many British politicians were painting. And yet, notwithstanding the 
fluctuating levels of support for Community membership, in 1976 the 
Community was seen as being important in terms of their children's 
future and support for Community membership was higher when viewed 
in terms of in ten to fifteen years' time in 1977 and 1978. Perhaps 
despite the grumbles the world outside which had looked a little cold 
in 1975 was looking distinctly colder and that despite all the 
difficulties, no-one really wanted a more insecure life. 
It was certainly not possible to claim that the Germans were 
very enthusiastic in their expectations of future living standards. 
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In 1975, 66% also believed that the general situation had deteriorated 
compared with four or five years earlier although perhaps less vigorously 
than the British, and slightly fewer, 57%, two years later, compared 
to the British expected living standards to improve. They were not 
exactly optimistic either as 55% of German citizens in 1980 believed 
only that living standards were static. 10 The Germans, as I indicated 
earlier, were worried about the cost of living and also the effect 
of the growing economic difficulties on their economy. They were not 
prepared to be Europe's sole banker, and significantly, in spite of 
being supportive of Community membership they had experienced a sudden 
drop to under 50% in support for membership in 1976. The inter-Community 
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wrangles and the economic uncertainty of the 1970s were clearly making 
even the wealthy German nation feel uncomfortable as, for the first 
time perhaps since the founding of the Community, there was a slow-
down in economic growth amongst the member States. 
Germany tended to favour the status quo in socio-political attitudes 
and perhaps there was beginning to be a crisis of confidence over the 
future amongst German people? Both nations had already emitted signs 
of instrumentalism and the Germans were becoming more inward-looking 
when it carne to the benefits of membership, in the sense that they 
were worrying about the threat to their prosperity and way of life. 
The unease in both nations was also reflected by surveys made in 1980 
into their expectations for 1981. It was not an optimistic picture 
as most British and German people expected 1981 to be a troubled year. 
Whereas 48% of Germans thought that 1981 would be about the same for 
themselves personally, 48% of British people expected things to be 
worse, but a third of the British people did expect a better year in 
contrast to 8% of Germans. However, whereas the British were divided 
over whether they expected an increase in strikes and disputes, the 
d 'd h . h . d . d . 1 1 . 11 Germans ~ not expect any c ange ~n t e~r goo ~n ustr~a re at~ons. 
As I have reiterated, both nations assessed themselves to be 
fairly happy with life throughout the five years being analysed in 
the thesis although as I have demonstrated, this basic happiness did 
mask many anxieties in both nations. It was also a fact that it was 
not just international problems which were influencing attitudes, more 
personal factors were also playing a part. But it was growing harder 
to push to one side the possible effects of internal domestic factors 
on attitudes to further European integration and Community membership. 
Growing conservatism and an element of protectionism was apparent as 
wrangles between the member States occurred. I noted that it was not 
just the British who were anxious about their standard of living but 
was there any significant difference in how well off each nation 
assessed itself to be? 
In 1975 according to a Eurobarometer survey, both nations had 
different priorities when assessing which was the most important 
personal problem, the Germans worrying mostly about personal or family 
12 problems, the British about prices, wages and the family budget, and 
a 1976 survey revealed that for Germany unemployment was the major 
priority and for Britain it was inflation. 13 This is interesting as 
Germany did not have a major problem over unemployment yet was worried. 
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In Britain one could see the effects of the economic crisis on attitudes 
and linked to this was a survey made in 1975 which revealed that both 
British and Germans alike were complaining that prices had risen more 
. 1 . . 14 d 1976 quickly 1n re at1on to 1ncomes an a survey saw more Germans 
and British alike assess themselves to be on the half-way point of 
a poor-rich scale although a quarter of British people believed that 
they were poor in contrast to 28% of Germans assessing themselves as 
15 
well-off. Perhaps everything is relative but it was curious that 
a relatively rich nation should be so worried about its standard of 
living whereas it would not be surprising if Britain after years of 
economic decline and no signs apparent of expected benefits of Community 
membership should show discontent. Earlier in the thesis I made the 
point that perhaps the Germans were basically more pessimistic in their 
nature than were the British and therefore less likely to be disappointed 
as their expectations were lower. But on the contrary one began to 
wonder if the Germans after years of few economic difficulties were 
more inclined to feel threatened by small changes in their way of life 
than were the British who had not actually .grasped the straw of 
Community membership out of a sense of great purpose rather more out 
of a feeling of "What else was there?" 
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Taylor noted the perceived effects of membership in British 
eyes after the initial period of optimism of 1975. He states that 
as the condition of the British economy declined, the British became 
more critical of the Communities which were perceived to be the culprit. 
The failure of membership to generate tangible returns was a decisive 
factor and there was a lack of a sense that membership was bound up 
with grand principles such as commitment to a common destiny which 
ld h d h d . . 16 wou ave countere t e ~sappo~ntment. 
The years 1976 to 1977 saw a negative balance in relations 
between Britain and the Community; there were the problems over the 
Common Agricultural POlicy and, according to Dalton and Hall, continuing 
conflicts between the British fishing industry and Community policy 
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makers. Early in 1978 there was negative news about the Community's 
impact on commerce and industry and 1978 also saw the negotiations 
on the European Monetary System. There were disagreements on the 
economic front which according to Taylor affected perceptions of how 
the E.M.S. would be managed. The British disagreed with the Germans 
about the adoption of an economic strategy to stimulate growth, 
believing that Germany and other stronger economies should take a lead 
. fl . h . . 18 ~n re at~ng t e~r econom~es. Clearly the situation in Britain and 
its political relationship with the Community, in particular the 
negative impression given to the public by the British Governments 
of the 1970s could not enhance the public's opinion of Community 
membership. The new Conservative Government of Mrs. Thatcher had 
inherited a number of pressures and expectations about the adjustment 
of Britain's contribution to the Communities Budget. The previous 
·Labour Government had taken the line that it was an important matter 
and this attitude was to be found in the informed media and in the 
administration. 19 I shall be considering public attitudes to the Press 
and to information on the Communities in the thesis at a later stage 
but one cannot escape the possibility of a linkage between the negative 
impressions being given of the benefits of Community membership by 
politicians and, perhaps too, by the British Media and the rapid 
decline in Community support amongst the British public. Perhaps 
Germany too in 1976 was subject to negative impressions of Community 
developments which were having a distinct effect on public attitudes 
towards the Community. The difficulties over the economic negotiations 
could not have been enhanced by the fact that as Taylor noted the 
Germany of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was more 'nationalist' and prone 
to stress short-term interests in Europe than that of his predecessor 
Willy Brandt. 20 
I have been discussing the attitudes in Germany and Britain in 
terms of a dimension of instrumentalism on the part of the general 
public and perhaps one could argue that such instrumentalism as did 
exist was encouraged by the attitudes of the political elite. The 
Germans clearly were more supportive of the Community than were the 
British whose opinion, according to Dalton and Duval, is characterised 
by considerable negativism and temporal change. They state that 
"the public mood apparently responds to changes in the foreign policy 
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. ( . f d . 1. 21 env1ronment, - access1on, the Re eren urn, Commun1ty po 1cy outputs -)". 
But one does detect some similarity in the attitudes of both the Germans 
and the British, particularly as I have pointed out where there is 
some expectation of national action by them which would have an effect 
on their lives. The political situation in the latter 1970s was 
apparently not conducive to encouraging Community spirit. 
Bearing these findings in mind I would like to briefly compare 
a set of general attitudes, that of the German and British long-term 
social priorities for their countries which perhaps demonstrate and 
Table 3 
Aggregate of First/Second Choices: Placed in Order of Priority 
Germany 
1977 
Fighting rising prices 
Maintenance of law and order 
Giving people more say in Government 
decisions 
Protecting freedom of expression 
Britain 
1977 
Fighting rising prices 
Maintenance of law and order 
Giving the people more say in 
Government decisions 
Protecting freedom of expression 
(65%) 
(57%) 
(33%) 
(27%) 
(71%) 
(64%) 
(33%) 
(27%) 
Germany 
1980 
Maintaining order in the nation 
Fighting rising prices 
Giving the people more say in 
important Government Decisions 
Protecting freedom of speech 
Britain 
1980 
Fighting rising prices 
Maintaining order in the nation 
Giving the people more say in 
important Government decisions 
Protecting freedom of speech 
( 73%) 
(65%) 
(34%) 
(28%) 
(67%) 
(55%) 
(48%) 
(30%) 
~ 
0'1 
explain apparent attitudinal priorities in relation to Community issues 
and problems. European Commission sponsored opinion polls in 1977 and 
1980 revealed slight but subtle differences in opinion in the two 
nations (see Table 3)? 2 
In both nations the issue of prices and therefore, presumably, 
the cost of living, was of considerable importance although one must 
also acknowledge that over the years, although prices remained top 
priority for the British there was a slight fall in the number of 
people citing the issue. There were two fundamental changes in both 
nations over the years. In Germany, Maintenance of Law and Order had 
become top priority, possibly reflecting internal security problems 
of terrorism and also the somewhat less stable situation in the 
Government whereas in Britain although there was no change in the 
order of priorities there was quite a striking increase amongst those 
citing Giving the People more say in Government Decisions, with 
Maintenance of Law and Order declining as a priority. The British 
had undergone a very stressful time in the late 1970s, (I.M.F. Loan; 
Winter of Discontent), but perhaps with the election of a new 
Conservative Government, (on a Law and Order ticket), a mood of greater 
stability was prevailing in Britain in contrast to her Community 
colleague. 
One might expect to see the repercussions of these attitudes 
appearing with relation to Community issues, for instance a feeling 
of a lack of internal stability might have led German people to have 
a less secure outlook and a desire for greater security and stronger 
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ties within the Community itself. Having detected signs of instrumentalism 
on the part of both Germany and Britain I should now like to elaborate 
on this theme somewhat further by discussing the willingness of both 
nations to accept some aspect of sacrifice in the cause of the Community 
and fellow Community colleagues. How much, one wonders, was a professed 
desire to help the poorer nations mere lip-service or was there a 
genuine Community spirit prevailing? The European Commission 
sponsored opinion polls posed the question of willingness to make a 
personal sacrifice, firstly in 1976 when the public was asked whether 
if a member nation was in major economic difficulties the other members 
should help it. This received complete support in both nations, (over 
70%) but as time progressed both countries backed the idea but there 
was a decline in 1978 in Germany to 63%, (70% in Britain) perhaps 
reflecting Community difficulties and Germany's own role. 23 
Germany was after all the major contributor to the Community 
budget and perhaps there was a growing fear that as the economic climate 
slowly deteriorated it would be she who would have to make a sacrifice 
and not other nations. The British, in view of the fact that they 
sought and expected Community help with their financial problems, may 
have believed that it could be their country which might be in the 
position of needing help and therefore favoured Community assistance 
to an afflicted member. It was a clear case of contrasting self-
interest. 
In discussing socio-political attitudes I drew out the fact that 
it was the British who complained more that they had not achieved 
their hopes (in 1978) with an emerging tendency towards self-interest 
in social attitudes. It did become clear, however, that the relative 
conservatism in socio-political attitudes in both nations was being 
rapidly translated into determination to protect the individual country 
and therefore its own personal way of life. In spite of criticism 
of Britain that she was obsessed with 'Her Money' (viz. the Budget 
negotiations) it had to be said that the Germans too appeared to display 
a protective tendency when the possibility that Germany might have 
48 
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to foot a large bill on behalf of a weaker member was envisaged. 
There were internal disagreements over Community issues in the 1970s 
in the German Government as well as the British Government in addition 
to inter-Community wrangles over, for example, the Budget. When one 
looks at attitudes to the Community throughout this period (and to 
socio-political factors) one cannot help notice the linkage between 
the negativeness of the situation and the general and growing dis-
satisfaction in Britain. An I.T.N. Opinion Poll in 1979 also 
demonstrated the unwillingness on the part of the British to also 
act as some sort of Community benefactor. According to I.T.N. findings, 
Mrs. Thatcher had majority support in Britain for her proposal that 
Britain should pay no more into the Community than she got out and 
that most people would have been satisfied with a substantial reduction 
. b h' 24 1n mem ers 1p costs. 
The picture which appeared to be emerging was one of two nations 
who increasingly viewed the Community out of eyes of self-interest and 
with socio-political attitudes which had become or remained fairly 
traditional. But of course this is an over-simplified summary of 
a complicated situation. It would be fair to say that strong strands 
of similarity in attitudes were evident but it has to be seen whether 
these similarities translated into more specific areas such as 
European integration. I pointed out earlier that when the Community 
was viewed on a long-term basis, attitudes in Britain grew distinctly 
more favourable than when the Community was considered in the short-
term. This was exemplified by a question posed in 1976 into how 
important the Community was considered for the future of one's children. 
The British, more than any other member country, considered the 
Community as being important, the Germans meriting seventh position 
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(in spite of a 71% response). As only 32% of the Germans, in comparison 
with 55% of the British actually rated the Community as very important 
for their children's future, it shook the automatic assumption that 
the British were biased entirely against the Community. 25 
The Germans had not turned out to be progressive in their socio-
political attitudes and perhaps the arguments of the mid- to -late 
1970s were not encouraging them to have an open outlook. Like the 
British they had revealed a degree of small-mindedness and it leads 
me to question whether the almost continuous support for Community 
membership was based on a need for security and not pragmatic idealism. 
After over twenty years of membership it would be hard to contemplate 
anything else particularly as there was little likelihood of German 
reunification, therefore the economic uncertainties were not something 
which the Germans could easily shrug off. Although they themselves 
were not experiencing the worst of the Recession, perhaps memories 
of an earlier 20th Century recession were undermining their confidence. 
Only in certain matters specific to Germany such as the industrial 
relations climate were they able to display a greater degree of 
confidence than the British. 
These findings were even more evident in a 1980 Eurobarometer 
survey which revealed that the British felt things were going fairly 
well for themselves and their spouses whereas Germans were divided 
between responding "fairly well" (47%) and "neither well nor badly" 
(44%). 26 \ Matters were no clearer over the ability to make ends meet 
as most British people felt that they could just about make ends meet 
{with 27% also responding they could make ends meet easily). The 
Germans though were divided, 37% believing they could make ends meet 
. 27 d 
easily and 39% that they could JUSt about manage. Germans appeare 
to differ in their view of Germany compared to other countries who 
believed she was a rich nation with no need to worry and one could 
well imagine that with such an apparently poor assessment of their 
situation the Germans would not welcome further integration without 
many qualms , especially in the long-term. It was also doubtful if 
Germans would feel obliged to help another member countiy in the 
cause of integration, particularly if they believed Germany might 
lose out economically. Quite a few Germans had expressed doubts at 
making a sacrifice and Morgan pointed out that Germany looked at 
integration in terms of possible future prosperity for Germany with 
limits to the price she would pay. 28 Where then was the sense of 
Community spirit? 
One might expect the British with their misgivings about 
Community membership to be concerned about internal domestic issues 
and clearly the domestic misgivings and lack of support for membership 
were part of a general feeling of not gaining, the signs of general 
disillusionment having become apparent shortly after the Referendum. 
The Germans, however, were held to be European idealists; surely they 
ought not to have been so concerned with the domestic situation as 
they were? Germans had been happy with the benefits of Community 
membership for years but perhaps their reaction to Community 
difficulties was a growing sense of hanging on to what they had 
gained and not being charitable. A further point which I made no 
mention of was that the Community was established in the 1950s as an 
economic Community for the enhancement of living standards of the 
member nations. A political Community was a far-off goal. There 
were major benefits for over twenty years and therefore it is not 
irrelevant to consider feelings of well-being or satisfaction of life 
for the Community had been expected to enhance these. It became 
reasonable to assume that for a member State to have grievances that 
the future seemed bleaker and things were not going well would have 
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direct repercussions on feelings towards the Community itself. 
Rabier and Inglehart stated that the Community publics did 
seem to attribute prevailing economic conditions to their Community 
membership and in Britain's case there was a direct link revealed by 
the drop in support for the Community. 29 The Germans displayed it 
indirectly through their unwillingness to make sacrifices though 
being good Community supporters. In their arguments with fellow 
members they seemed to be seeking to protect their own interests 
through policies and strategies which would enhance or maintain 
Germany. The Germans and the British had different roles in the 
Community and different experiences on becoming members. They were 
not so different in their socio-political and general attitudes however. 
The early implications in terms of attachment to Nation-state did not 
seem to reveal great German desire to submerge their culture in order 
to become 'European'. A country which felt a desire to maintain its 
standard of living and not make sacrifices was not displaying idealistic 
tendencies of 'Community Spirit'. In Community terms the British were 
not known either for displaying such a spirit. According to Marquand, 
movements in a supra-national direction would not be popular in 
Britain and he pointed out that British politicians, when opposing 
further integration, tended to think in terms of Britain and not the 
Community. However, although the Germans may have been more Community 
minded than the British, the degree to which they supported integration 
. 30 
was uncerta1n. 
Slater, in discussing the Community in general, drew attention 
to integrationist arguments that although a high level of goodwill 
towards a united Europe existed amongst the publics of the member 
nations, the degree of positive commitment was suspect. The public 
appeared to favour European integration in the same way that they 
52 
favoured peace; both are desirable goals but the full implications 
and costs of attaining a goal of European unification were left 
unconsidered and when considered may be found to be less than 
31 
acceptable. Surveys in 1975 and 1976 into the problems the 
Community was facing, I revealed, showed that there was support in 
both nations for unspecific concepts such as helping the poor but that 
support teetered when actual direct action might be required. Slater 
pointed out that although a majority of Europeans felt a fellow member 
State should be helped by the others if in severe economic difficulty, 
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only a minority were willing, and least of all the Germans (and Italians), 
to make such a commitment if it involved personal sacrifice. 32 According 
to Inglehart, British support for European integration was far higher 
than their utilitarian assessment which perhaps explained the British 
tendency to become more positive about the Community when considering 
it in general terms in spite of their low assessment of membership. 33 
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Chapter 4 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: ATTACHMENT TO 
EXISTING INSTITUTIONS, TRUST 
I shall now turn directly to the question of attitudes 
to European integration and expansion of the Community whilst also 
bringing into focus such background factors as attachment to existing 
national institutions and trust in other member nations. These 
factors, especially those pertaining to national institutions are 
important for the very idea of European integration brings into 
question the vexed idea of the Community as a political entity not 
just an economic structure. In Britain the question of the Community 
in political terms had raised severe doubts and worries over British 
sovereignty. The issue had figured prominently in the 1975 Referendum 
campaign and was one of the bugbears of the British Labour Party and 
of many on the right and centre of the political spectrum also. It 
was an issue which coloured British political attitudes throughout 
the 1970s thus encouraging the public tendency to volatility. 
I shall first consider the issue of trust in other nations as 
I believe that this may have a direct link with attitudes to the 
Community in general and to expansion of the Community, taking into 
consideration previous analysis of attitudes both specific and general. 
This will then lead into a consideration of European integration 
whereupon I shall draw into the analysis attitudes to the Nation-
state and national institutions. Before embarking on either question 
I would now like to briefly analyse the findings of a later 1978 
Eurobarometer opinion poll which considered various attitudes of 
the public's hopes and fears about the Community prior to the 1979 
1 . . 1 European E ect1on campa1gn. Table 4 follow:-
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TABLE 4 
The fact that we are part of 
the Community is the best 
guarantee of political and 
economic stability: 
In the Common Market a country 
like ours runs a risk of 
losing its own culture and 
individuality: 
The member countries of the 
E.E.C. should go much 
further than they have so 
far towa.rds economic and 
political union in Europe: 
Whatever agreements or 
alliances [ ••• ]with other 
countries, national inde-
pendence should be the 
overriding consideration: 
Britain 
52% Agree 
39% Disagree 
57% Agree 
36% Disagree 
53% Agree 
29% Disagree 
71% Agree 
18% Disagree 
57 
Germany 
67% Agree 
18% Disagree 
27% Agree 
58% Disagree 
70% Agree 
15% Disagree 
57% Agree 
29% Disagree 
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These findings proved to be a barometer of public opinion in the 
two nations as the major tendencies were clearly brought out; 
nationalism, need for security, support for national cultural values, 
(the British especially). What was quite striking was the German 
desire for national independence, albeit not as strong as the British 
desire, but certainly giving credence to Taylor's view of a national-
istic Germany under Chancellor Schmidt. Eurobarometer opinion polls 
in 1980 had revealed the degree of uncertainty of the future which 
I 
had developed in both Germany and Britain and as I stated earlier, 
the world outside of the Community appeared cold which was one reason 
for the 1975 Referendum decision. The British might not have liked 
the Community, grumbled incessantly about lack of benefit from 
membership, but had not moved from the 1975 position querying what 
alternative to the Community there was. The relationship with the 
Commonwealth was in decline and there was a need for another market 
for British goods which was vital in a world of economic uncertainty. 
I pointed out in discussing socio-political attitudes that the 
British appeared to express a greater tendency to cling to traditional 
values as time progressed. Perhaps the survey findings revealed 
a desire for continuity not change. The survey demonstrated once 
again the depth to which either country would go to establish European 
integration for, although both appeared to accept the idea in principle, 
one could quite clearly see that the Nation-state per-se had not 
become an irrelevance although, possibly due to their long-standing 
experience of membership of the Community the Germans were unworried 
about the effects of membership on the national culture. However, 
before considering European integration as such I shall assess 
attitudes to the other member nations. Had a basic understanding 
developed after several years' membership? Or rather were any age-
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old prejudices evident? Trust between nations would be naturally 
important if an entity such as the Community sought to develop or 
expand. 
It would not be unreasonable to assume that a country which 
might persist in a long-standing dislike of a particular nation 
might not express whole-hearted willingness to cooperate with that 
nation. A 1980 Eurobarometer survey looked at the question of 
trust in others and included the newest recruit to the Community, 
2 
the Greeks. Table 5 follows below: 
Table 5 
Trust in Others: The Peoples of the Community and the Greeks 
in descending order) 
Trusted: (percentages in brackets) 
Germany Britain 
Danes (70%) Dutch (71%) 
Luxembourgers (68%) Danes (66%) 
Dutch (68%) Germans (60%) 
French (67%) Belgians (55%) 
British (65%) Irish (51%) 
Belgians (63%) Luxembourgers (49%) 
Irish (54%) Italians (39%) 
Greeks (40%) Greeks (37%) 
Italians (29%) French (32%) 
One cannot help perhaps reflect at first glance that it would 
be hard to discount the fact that age-old prejudices continued to surface, 
one very clear example being that of the few British people who 
displayed trust in the French; secondly the tendency of neither 
country to cite a 'Latin' country in a top three position. 
The Germans, possibly due to their long-standing ties and 
cooperation, post-war, did, in contrast to the British, trust the 
French very highly. But certainly neither the Italians nor the Greeks 
secured positions of trust. Age-old loyalties played their part, the 
Germans trusted the Danes most of all, the British citing the Dutch 
perhaps due to history and trade. One interesting point was that 
although they were not placed in identical positions in the lists, 
almost the same percentage of British people trusted the Germans as 
did the Germans trust the British. 
So what is the point which could be drawn from this survey? 
Certainly it was clear that possibly neighbourhoodness .and history 
had much to do with trust, the Germans clearly responding more to their 
immediate neighbours and the British, too, to countries with whom they 
had long-standing ties, such as the Danes, Dutch and the Irish. It 
also became clear that membership of the Community alone would not 
break down barriers which might enhance integration as could clearly 
be seen in the case of Germany. 
Twitchett, in discussing British attitudes to Europe pointed out 
that the British still considered Britain as being 'in' but not 'with' 
Community Europe, referring to the historical legacy of separation from 
continental Europe both geographically and via a deliberate policy 
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of isolation. The peoples of continental Europe were seen as 'foreigners' 
of a wholly different order to the peoples of old, white Commonwealth 
countries. 3 Roger Morgan made the point that there were some transient 
German reservations towards the impending new member countries; (Spain 
and Portugal), which they had also displayed over Britain, France and 
Italy but these had involved Christian Democrat fears of left-wing 
forces in these countries and their possible intervention in the 
Community (the Christian Democrats being fundamentally supported by 
conservatives and Catholics, thus demonstrating my point of a link 
between religion and political and social attitudesJ. 4 
Having considered basic attitudes to trust, I would now like 
to consider a survey made in 1976 which raised the question of whether 
there were any member nations which they preferred to see leave the 
Community. 1976 was the year in which German support for the Community 
dipped below 50% and in spite of expressing doubts over membership, 
the British had assessed the Community as important for the future 
of their children but both had had their doubts over the benefits of 
Community membership on prices though they had differed as to the 
benefit of membership on the individual nation's economy. It was 
therefore striking that it was the British who responded highly that 
they had no desire for any country to leave (70%). The German response 
was distinctly lower (57%). When considered in detail the findings 
provided clear signs of disgruntlement on the part of quite a few 
5 Germans as was shown by Table 6: 
Table 6 
Countries which Interviewees would 
like to see leave the Community 
in descending order) 
(None: 70% Britain: 57% Germany) 
Germany Britain 
Italy (26%) Britain 
United Kingdom (19%) Italy 
France (10%) 
Ireland ( 9%) Ireland 
France 
Belgium ( 2%) 
Germany 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands Belgium ( 1%) 
Denmark Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Denmark 
( 9%) 
(7%) 
( 3%) 
(1%) 
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The most striking finding also appears to correlate with the 
findings on trust. Italy, the least trusted nation in 1980, was the 
country which four years earlier in 1976, slightly more than a quarter 
of Germans would have liked to have seen leave the Community: in fact 
it was the one country which both nations were very unhappy about. 
Britain too was high on the list although by 1980 the Germans were 
very trustful of the British. Certainly more people in Germany were 
expressing dissatisfaction with other member countries than were the 
British. If one ignores the percentages as such and considers the 
list in terms of the descending order of nations selected it is 
interesting that both Britain and Germany named France, (and also 
Ireland) high on the list. Countries which were trusted in 1980 such 
as Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium, earned minimal support for 
the idea of their leaving the Community in 1976. Perhaps one of 
the reasons for the low support amongst the British for countries to 
leave was that they feared being left in a Community in which they 
had no 'natural' allies: one must recall that it was the Dutch who 
had sought to bring Britain into the Community in the 1960s and German 
opinion for a long time had favoured British membership of the Community 
although perhaps the 19% who wanted them to leave were reacting to 
the behaviour of the British since becoming members. Clearly by 
1980 Germans had fewer qualms about the British themselves. It might 
be interesting to note that according to a survey undertaken in 1980 
which looked at the European's trust in other Community members both 
the British and Germans enjoyed a similar level of trust by their 
fellow Europeans; in the League Table the British enjoyed sixth position 
and the Germans, fifth. Table 7 below reveals precisely the actual 
6 level of trust: 
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Table 6 
Europeans' Trust in Other Europeans in 1980 
Not 
Very Fairly Particularly Not at all No 
Trustworthy Trustworthy Trustworthy Trustworthy ~ 
Germans 20% 49% 19% 12% 11% 
British 14% 52% 25% 9% 10% 
As one could see there was very little difference in the level of 
trust that the British and Germans enjoyed and possibly the figures 
might have been a factor in the fairly positive outlook of the British 
towards the idea of political union in Europe. Possibly the fact that 
they were not seen as the 'scourge of Europe' might have played some 
part in shaking the British age-old suspiciousness of foreigners and 
encouraged them in expressing trust in their Community compatriots. 
Certainly their views had not differed too substantially from the 
Germans in their mistrust of 'Latin' members of Community Europe, 
(apart from the French). Perhaps they realised that they shared 
similar opinions as other members in their mistrust of the French and 
Italians and Greeks, these three nations being placed in the bottom 
three of the League Table with the Italians at the very bottom. In 
the 1978 Hopes and Fears Eurobarometer survey the British had been 
supportive of the idea that the fact that they were part of the 
Community was the best guarantee of economic and political stability 
giving credence to the idea of the British need for security, 
a need exacerbated by the rocky economic climate of the 1970s. Possibly 
by 1980 the fact that they were, in spite of all the difficulties, 
seen as a nation to be trusted, encouraged them to trust others and 
to support European unificationin spite of misgivings over the 
national identity within Europe. 
Turning to the question of Community expansion, a 1980 Euro-
barometer survey into attitudes to Greek entry, (between 1977 and 1980), 
revealed an indifferent, (neither good nor bad), response on the part 
of from 34% up to 43% of the British, with only just over a fifth 
believing Greek entry was good. The Germans were more positive, 
41%/43% (and in April 1980, 46%) believing Greek entry was good, 
though around a third offered an indifferent response. 7 
A further survey made in 1980 looked, however, at attitudes to 
trust in the Spanish and Portuguese compared to trust in the Greeks 
and found in fact that there was great unease in both nations and a 
high level of mistrust in all three. Table 7 below offers a clear 
. d' . f h f' d' 8 ~n ~cat~on o t e ~n ~ngs: 
Table 7 
Britain 
Trust Mistrust Don't Know 
Spanish 34% 41% 25% 
Portuguese 35% 21% 44% 
Greeks 37% 28% 35% s 
Britain 
Trust Mistrust Don't Know 
Spanish 43% 48% 9% 
Portuguese 33% 52% 15% 
Greeks 40% 48% 12% 
The Germans, in spite of being quite supportive of Greek entry 
into the Community were very mistrustful of the Greeks, slightly more 
so than they mistrusted the Spanish: the least trusted nation was 
clearly the Portuguese. The British gave a very high 'Don't Know' 
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response, especially when asked about the Portuguese. The British 
responses tended, as a result, to be less clear-cut. The Spanish, 
for example, elicited the lowest 'Don't Know' response and were trusted 
least by the British. This is especially interesting for the British 
still selected Spain as their most popular choice of tourist area and 
yet they appeared not to have much trust in the people. Knowledge 
of the Greeks and Portuguese was distinctly lower and there did appear 
to be a more trustful than mistrustful stance. But certainly there 
was no significant degree of trust in either Britain or Germany for 
any of the three nations. 
I would like to point out at this stage that there was a contrast 
between the governmental outlook and public opinion. Both Governments 
favoured the Mediterranean expansion of the Community on political 
and strategic grounds. It was doubtful if the public shared this 
view. Linked to these surveys were surveys made in Autumn 1977 and 
1978 which assessed attitudes specifically to Spanish membership and 
both nations increasingly over the years expressed the view that 
Spanish membership was neither good nor bad for their own country. 
The Germans did feel initially that Spanish membership would be good 
but were becoming more doubtful about this as time went on, (down to 
37% from 48%). The British response was lower with 24% down from 
31% believing Spanish entry would be good. In 1978 both nations, 
however, believed that Spanish entry would be most beneficial of all 
to Spain herself, (72% of Germans and 61% of British people). 9 A 
1980 Eurobarometer survey revealed that in fact over the preceding 
ten to fifteen years few people had actually visited either Greece, 
Spain or Portugal, (66% in Britain and 59% in Germany responding that 
they had not). Amongst those who had, Spain was the most visited, 
(26% of the British, 29% of the Germans), and only 10% in either 
country had visited Greece and about 5%, Portugal.10 When it came 
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to the ability to actually name the three countries which had asked 
to join the Community, the Germans appeared better informed with 51% 
being able to name Spain, 49% Greece and 39% Portugal but 39% responded 
'Don't Know'. In Britain 55% of people gave a 'Don't Know' response 
and of those who were able to name a country, 37% could name Spain, 
11 21% Greece, and only 16% Portugal •. 
In spite of lack of first-hand knowledge of the three countries, 
both Britain and Germany expressed attitudes to these three Latin 
countries which appeared to differ little from views expressed of Italy, 
(and of France by Britain). Gertainly they did not trust them even 
if in Germany there was slightly higher support for their entry. This 
apparent reserve towards 'Latin' nations did not suggest that the 
likelihood of European expansion and integration would be a whole-
hearted phenomenon and nor did there appear to be signs of willingness 
to submerge personal inherent attitudes for the good of the Community. 
The three nations were agriculturally based and as both Germany and 
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Britain were the major contributors to the Community Budget and therefore 
to the Common Agriculture Policy it might be fair to argue that 
economics were again playing a part in shaping attitudes, for it could 
well be that these countries might require help and neither country, 
and the Germans especially, had expressed complete willingness to help 
a member nation in difficulty or make a sacrifice to help them. It 
was doubtful if vague theories such as helping the rich and poor 
were to be turned from theory to reality the same degree of support 
for them would exist and as I have noted public opinion did not share 
the opinion of their Governments towards Mediterranean expansion. 
The British were already critical of the money they had to give 
to the Community and, as Morgan said, the Germans saw the inclusion 
of the three nations as enhancing Germany's and the Community's 
prosperity but there were limits to the price they would pay for such 
expansion. 12 The clear high level of mistrust expressed would not 
translate easily into idealistic desire for unifying Europe once it 
carne to a discussion of the actual way in which they might be achieved, 
and as could be seen, years of economic uncertainty were not providing 
the ideal framework for grand principles to come to fruition, bringing 
with them growing desire for self-protection, (in the economic sphere), 
and less liberalism coupled with maintenance of traditional values, 
(in the socio-political sphere). Eurobarorneter opinion polls into 
attitudes to European integration between 1975 and 1980 revealed that 
in Germany and Britain there was support for the idea of European 
unification with percentages of between 74% and 82% in Germany (highest 
support occurring in 1979) and between 50% and 63% in Britain, (highest 
support in 1978 and late 1980), thus confirming Slater's opinion that 
a reservoir of public support for unification existed in Europe and 
also that there existed higher levels of support for the more general 
goal of European unification compared to support for Community member-
h . 13 s 1p. The depth of support for unification was questionable and 
certainly when people were asked specifically, (between 1975 and 1979) 
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to state their opinion on the rate of European integration, the situation 
was less clear cut. The Germans either favoured speeding up the movement 
towards unification, (between 35% and 47%), or wanted it to continue 
at the present rate, (between 34% and 46%). In Britain the response 
was more in favour of unification continuing at the present rate, (between 
42% and 52%) although between 23% and 28%, (19% in early 1979), favoured 
unification speeding up. More British people also wanted unification 
14 
to slow down. 
A 1975 European Commission sponsored opinion poll compared age 
and sex responses in 1975 to unification. British responses in favour 
of unification were lower and also strikingly, the lowest response 
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in favour of unification carne from young British people, the older 
age groups being more in favour. In Germany, older men proved to be 
most supportive, (most supportive of everyone in fact), older German 
women being less supportive. The young in Germany, unlike the British 
youth, were also highly in favour of unification as were the rnid-aged. 15 
Perhaps the greater support among older Germans for unification, (compared 
to Britain) was explained, as Noelle-Neurnann said, by the fact that 
••• after the horrors of the Hitler period and the 1945 
collapse, the European idea was something like a refuge 
for many Germans, a compensation for their own lost 
national consciousness.l6 
I will discuss education later in the thesis but it is worth noting 
that those with highest education in Britain were more supportive of 
unification, support increasing with the level of education attained. 
In Germany this was the case too, but support was high amongst all 
levels of education. 
Slater's questioning of the commitment to European unification 
was also raised by other political researchers. Opinion research 
certainly gave credence to the theory that the British especially 
were most critical of the Community. Marquand stated that the 
British seemed to be less enthusiastic about belonging to the 
17 Community than any other people. Twitchett argued that whatever 
the pros and cons there was considerable evidence to suggest that 
despite seven years or so of membership the majority of Britons 
. . b h. 18 did not accept the log~c of Commun~ty mern ers ~p. But although 
Dalton and Duval also added that the British had been critical of 
European integration and that they could not assume that a reservoir 
of diffuse support existed in Britain to sustain the Community through 
the next steps in the integration process, they did go on to make the 
point that the Community itself had undergone a crisis of support 
bl . 19 amongst the European mass pu ~cs. 
Noelle-Neurnann commented that the German population assessed the 
Community's economic consequences differently, German surveys revealing 
that the prevailing answers to questions posed on Community membership 
in 1977 and 1978 were that German membership in the Community presented 
more of a disadvantage than an advantage compared to 1975 when member-
ship was seen as advantageous. She also uncovered a rising tide of 
conservatism in Germany which I detected in the responses to socio-
political questions and which one might reasonably assume was the 
consequence of growing difficulties in the Community and in the World 
itself in the 1970s. 20 The linkage between attitudes to the horne 
situation and subsequent worry over the economic and security situation 
with attitudes to the Community was unavoidable. 
An I.T.N./O.R.C.opinion poll undertaken in June 1979, just after 
the European Elections possibly demonstrated well the conflict in 
British opinion between desire to pull out of the Community with the 
clear need for security overshadowed by a self-centred protection of 
British interests. Whilst more people (47%) declared themselves 
opposed to Britain being a member of the Community, (with 40% in 
favour), when asked if Britain's future interests would be better 
served by staying in the Community or by getting out, over 50% of 
voters believed that Britain's best interests would be served by 
staying in. 21 I shall compare the attitudes in both nations to the 
horne Parliament and the European Parliament by analysis of Euro-
barometer data but perhaps the results of a question also posed 
by I.T.N./O.R.C. offered a glimpse of the attitudes which abounded 
in Britain. Firstly there appeared to be either an element of lack 
of knowledge or lack of interest for, when asked about what the power 
of the European Parliament should be, the response was divided 
almost equally between those who believed the parliament should have 
more power (34%) and less (33%) with 33% responding that they did not 
know. However, convictions were clearly very firm when it carne to 
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what was expected of the European M.P.s themselves and here the self-
interest rose cleanly to the surface for a convincing 64% believed 
that the European M.P.s should be more concerned with protecting 
Britain's interests, not working for the Community's future. 22 These 
findings did appear to corroborate the findings of the 1978 Euro-
barometer survey into hopes and fears about the Community which 
revealed a desire for security in Britain but also desire for the 
protection of their own-interest. Although the I.T.N./O.R.C. opinion 
poll did not include the people of Northern Ireland it was evident 
that when their views were also taken into account jointly with the 
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views of people on the British mainland it was clear that these attitudes 
were basically common to all. 
I referred earlier in the thesis to the findings of another 
survey undertaken in 1979 by I.T.N./O.R.C. which revealed that the 
British concurred with Mrs. Thatcher's viewpoint that Britain should 
pay no more into the Community than she got out. Certainly throughout 
1979 although people were unhappy over membership they appeared not 
to be desirous of provoking a situation where Britain might actually 
get fed up and declare she was leaving the Community. Ultimately they 
appeared willing to accept a compromise providing the compromise resulted 
in Britain gaining something for 53% of those questioned believed that 
Britain should settle for the European proposal that Britain's net 
1 d h . d 23 cost of belonging to the Community shou d be re uced by a t 1r • 
Perhaps the true underlying attitude was demonstrated by the fact that 
although by November, 40% said Britain ought to pull out of the 
Community if she did not get what she wanted, a joint total of 44% 
believed that if the situation arose, Britain should either continue 
but press for further reductions or, most revealingly, allow the 
. h . . h b . 24 Community to operate but w1t some Br1t1s o struct1on. Perhaps 
this, more than anything, sums up British attitudes to cooperation 
with other European nations and perhaps was an indicator of possible 
future British attitudes which would prevail when European integration 
was to become a reality and not just a future proposal. I had already 
disclosed that there was a significant difference in attitudes when 
integration was merely a theory and when it was considered in specific 
terms. I shall make a brief analysis of the 1975 British Referendum 
separately but one thing which has a bearing on attitudes to integration 
was the fact that in the Referendum the British did vote overwhelmingly 
in favourof retaining membership when given a choice, that they had 
accepted retention of membership after the terms of British entry 
had been renegotiated which perhaps indicated that the British preferred 
compromise to an uncertain future. British opinion was very volatile 
as has been shown, Butler pointing out that British attitudes to Europe 
were extraordinarily fickle with a few consistent Euro-enthusiasts 
and a few consistent Empire men and Little Englanders. 25 Marquand 
suggested that if another Referendum were held on monetary union or 
a strong Community industrial or environmental policy with arguments 
for and against openly deployed as they were over membership of the 
Community, then the outcome might well be that of 1975. 26 
Butler also suggested that if a further Referendum were held, 
pro-Marketeers could probably rely on the forces which worked in 1975. 
In spite of the evidence of the 1978-1979 opinion polls which suggested 
a majority of voters regretted membership which was leading to 
commentators suggesting a scenario of the country withdrawing from 
the Community, few people suggested that such a step could be taken 
without a Referendum. 27 Judging by the British concentration on 
self-interest and desire for security which appeared to dominate 
their attitudes whilst being a Community member, the uncertainty of 
the outside world did not suggest that the British would happily walk 
into an uncertain future. Their viewpoint suggests that basically 
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they expected measures from the Community which would be of direct 
help to Britain and it was because these had not been immediately 
forthcoming that they were disillusioned over membership, not that 
they had any great desire to 'go it alone'. 
Which brings me now to an analysis of the Eurobarometer data 
which covered attitudes to European integration and also to the 
Nation-state. I shall then take a look at specific possibilities 
such as a common currency taking note of the findings of German data 
and research made by other political scientists. Bearing in mind the 
growing conservatism in both Britain and Germany and the desire to 
maintain the status quo in the home parliamentary situation with some 
divided responses on greater women's participation which revealed 
traditionalism in both Germany and Britain, I will investigate whether 
there were indeed great gaps in opinion in both nations when it came 
to adherence to national institutions. Britain was frequently accused 
of being too concerned over her sovereignty, but in spite of over 
twenty years of Community membership were the Germans as truly 
'European' as their support for membership might have suggested? 
A 1976 Eurobarometer survey into the principal policy aspects of 
European union revealed quite a high degree of accord between the 
two. It was true that British support was slightly lower than German 
support, usually around 50% compared to 70% or more for the suggested 
statements but without doubt the common denominator was national 
instrumentalism. The Eurobarometer detailed the four main aspects 
as follows: Common Foreign Policy; Common Economic and Monetary 
Policy; Common Regional and Social Policy (which would level out 
differencesin.favour of less favoured regions and social categories); 
Common Fundamental Rights (and Laws, allowing each citizen to appeal 
directly to the European Court of Justice). In both Germany and 
Britain first and second choice went to Common Fundamental Rights 
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and Common Foreign Policy, Fundamental Rights eliciting greatest support 
( 76% . 62 . . . ) 28 1n Germany; % 1n Br1ta1n • 
When one refers back to surveys undertaken in 1975 and 1976 into 
attitudes to problems the Community was tackling, it became clear that 
a pattern was emerging of support for policies which would benefit 
the own country per-se, bearing in mind how each nation pictured 
itself; the British seeing themselves as disadvantaged and that they 
should be assisted, not pay out; the Germans wanting greater unity 
but not at great cost to themselves. As I noted there was support 
in 1975 for idealistic principles of helping other countries but a 
personal sacrifice to achieve it was not acceptable and nor was it 
in order to bring about the unification of Europe. There was a tendency 
on the part of the British to view membership of the Community in a 
more positive light when it was considered in future vague terms. 
The same appeared to be true of attitudes to unification, for whilst 
supporting unification in principle, when asked to consider it in terms 
of achieving unification by 1980 there was less support, those in favour 
amounting to around 34%, those opposed to approximately 40%. 29 Never-
theless although the Germans supported unification being achieved by 
1980 they were very divided over the rate of unification. Between 
1975 and 1979 there were similar percentages for speeding unification 
30 
up and continuing at the present rate. 
Before I consider whether both nations shared similar attitudes 
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to their national parliaments I would like to take cognisance of Eurobarometer 
surveys in 1975 into the choice of form of political organisation. Both 
nations' primary choice was that of inter-governmental cooperation but 
whilst a third or so of the British supported the concept of National 
Independence, almost the same percentage of Germans favoured a 
European Parliament or Government. 31 Although the British had chosen 
to remain in the Community, clearly they were not by any means 
'European' in outlook, and the survey also possibly indicated 
differences in attitudes to the European Parliament itself. But 
what of their viewpoint on their national parliament? In discussing 
socio-political attitudes I noted both held firm views over what 
they expected of their national parliaments and M.P.s. 
A 1977 survey revealed that whilst both Germany and Britain 
regarded the role of their national parliament as important, they 
had differing views over the future with the British continuing to 
believe that the national parliament would play an important role 
and the Germans very divided between those who expected to maintain 
the status quo and those who believed it had a more important role 
to play. Neither country, noticeably, expected that their national 
parliaments were going to play a less important role which did beg 
the question of how much they would be prepared, either of them, to 
accept fundamental changes in their national system as they both clearly 
displayed attachment to the national institution, (however much the 
Germans may have declared that they wanted cooperation within the 
context of a European ParliamentJ. 32 Elaborating further, a 1975 
Eurobarometer survey posed the direct question of which was the 
preferred action over a number of issues, that of action by the 
European Community, or alternatively national independent action. 
A list is shown below: 33 
* Reducing the differences between the developed and 
less developed regions. 
* Fight against rising prices. 
* Protection of the natural environment and the struggle 
against pollution. 
* Make our presence felt in discussions with the Americans 
or the Russians. 
* A policy on energy supplies. 
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All of these categories received support in both nations for 
Community action as opposed to national independent action; however 
German support was higher in every case apart from the reduction of 
Differences between the regions. At least a third or more in Britain 
expressed a preference for National action, thus there was a sizeable 
minority in Britain who did not want European involvement. 
The one main conflicting attitude was over action on the 
modernisation of Agriculture which saw the British favour Community 
action whereas although the Germans supported it, there was a sizeable 
minority who wanted National action. Turning briefly to the question 
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of a Community foreign policy which as we have seen was quite acceptable 
to both nations, a Eurobarometer survey in 1977 offered two options, 
that of European foreign policy being carried out within the framework 
of the American Alliance or that Europe should have a foreign policy 
independent of the United States. Both nations, and especially Britain 
favoured the latter option. 34 This would seem to give clear credence 
to the findings of other polls which indicated that the British,in spite 
of the long-standing 'Special Relationship' between Britain and the 
United States were not too happy at being too closely linked to the 
United States. Historically they had enjoyed alliances with European 
nations as a major European Power. British willingness to submerge 
her own personal internal security and negotiate agreements for a 
Community policy was questionable but it did appear that the Community, 
an economic entity, was not seen as posing a threat to British military 
interests. The Germans possibly in view of their strategic position 
with an Eastern Bloc country as an immediate neighbour, supported 
European relations independent of the U.S.A. with an eye on her 
security although as I have discussed earlier in the thesis they 
were divided in .1976 in contrast to the British over the idea of 
strengthening the military defence capacity against possible enemies 
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and yet like the British, they believed a common foreign policy was 
important, Indeed as Herman and Lodge revealed, in analysing the findings 
of attitudes to a list of possible European Election priority issues 
in the July 1977 edition of Eurobarometer, defence capacity was of 
slightly more interest to them than it was to any other member nation 
and relations with the United States was of greatest interest to 
them. Without detailing the lists of priorities as such, the main 
point to be brought out by Herman and Lodge was that the priority 
issues selected by the respondents reflected national interests, the 
British for example selecting joint action on economic difficulties 
as a top priority and in terms of possible subjects for public debate 
in the European Elections they quoted most frequently the fairer sharing 
of costs and benefits among m.ember countries and the preservation of 
national traditions and identity; the Germans as well as seeking more 
independent relations between the Community and the U.S.A. also were 
noted for expressing interest in the Community's enlargement though 
it must also be acknowledged that around 50% of Germans did quote the 
sharing of benefits and joint economic action; only a third were 
. d b . 1 . d . 35 worr1e a out nat1ona 1 ent1ty. 
The question of national versus European identity rose to the 
surface again over the expected party political strategy in the 1979 
European Election campaign. The Germans expressed a preference for 
political parties of the same colour getting together, the trans-
national view, whereas the British wanted the national political parties 
36 
to campaign independently of each other. I shall be discussing the 
European Elections separately but it is important at this stage in 
the thesis to draw on some research findings as they offer a good 
insight into the attitudes of the two nations when confronted with 
an actual confirmed element in the integration process. 
Eurobarorneter surveys taken between 1977 and 1979 revealed that 
the balance in Germany was tipped in favour of expecting the M.E.P.s 
to favour the Community interest whilst over 50% of the British 
consistently backed the idea of M.E.P.s following the national interest 
h . 37 w en vot1ng. Both nations were in favour of the Election itself 
according to surveys made between 1975 and 1978 (with the Germans more 
. )38 
support1ve and both in 1978 believed that the Elections would 
lead to a stronger feeling of European citizenship and that they were 
an event with important consequences certain to make Europe more 
politically unified, although slightly more Germans than British felt 
that they were unimportant as the national governments would not be 
bound by the votes in the European Parliarnent. 39 As I pointed out 
earlier in discussing attitudes to democracy both nations had expressed 
satisfaction with democracy and in their basic attitudes to society 
reforms had taken number one priority, although I did expose some 
dissatisfaction, especially by the British, with some aspects of 
democracy in their horne nati0n. Clearly democracy was an important 
matter to them both and in the European context also for when asked 
to consider arguments about the Elections it was clear that they shared 
basic fundamental support for .the democratic institution of elected 
Parliaments for both supported highly the idea that the Elections 
were necessary in order to decide on the kind of Europe wanted and 
both, particularly the British, agreed that the Elections were necessary 
to give more democratic control over the Community and the Brussels 
.. l 40 
off1c1a s. However, British concern for the national institution 
emerged once again when they agreed that the~Elections would lead to 
the European Parliament having too much power compared to the national 
1 . 41 par 1arnent. It was clearly a contradictory situation for certainly 
the British supported the concept of the parliament and the democratic 
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right of Elections, yet they expected the Parliament to play a restraining 
role over Brussels but worried that this institution which they could 
see as being beneficial might interfere with the rights of their 
national parliament. It was perhaps a case of lack of knowledge 
possibly due to the remote image perpetrated by the Community insti-
tutions themselves or perhaps a demonstration of the confused picture 
being presented to the British public by the home Media and politicians 
which, as I have suggested, continued to portray the Community in a 
negative light. In terms of the future M.E.P.s themselves, both nations 
considered the candidates' ideas about Europe to be more important 
h h . 11 . 42 t an t e~r party a eg~ances. Marquand made the point in discussing 
Britain's attitude to the Community that as well as the Community 
not being popular according to the opinion polls, movements in a 
. . 1 . h 43 supra-nat~onal direct~on would not be popu ar e~t er. Certainly 
we have seen that there was an element of scepticism in Britain in 
spite of fundamental support for integration. A 1976 Eurobarometer 
survey considered whether there would be acceptance of supra-national 
votes of the European Parliament in the context of the creation of 
a European Tax, a European programme for Public Works, Foreign Matters 
such as Commercial Treaties and European Employment -legislation. The 
Germans were happy to accept all of them except for the idea of a 
European Tax which produced a divided response and thus again suggested 
that the Germans too were prone to express protectionist attitudes 
when direct action might be required of them which might not be seen 
as being beneficial to their own country and national system. 
The British expressed some scepticism but also almost 50% support 
for accepting the creation of a European Programme for Public Works 
and for Employment legislation, but were divided over the idea of 
supra-national parliamentary votes in Foreign matters and were opposed 
44 to the idea of a European Tax. It was very apparent that where 
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neither nation could see a personal benefit to be gained then they 
were not supportive of Community action and that Germany, notwith-
standing her greater support for the Community, would put a limit on 
the price t? which she would pay for Community integration. With this 
thought in mind, I would like to take a look at how the nations felt 
in terms of European concepts. Clearly they were both unhappy over 
the idea of a common European Tax but was this typical of German 
attitudes? How much of the national identity were they prepared 
to sacrifice in the name of the Community or was it possible to accuse 
them also of attachment to their sovereignty as the British were 
frequently so accused? I shall include evidence presented by German 
opinion poll data in considering these questions with a concentration 
on German attitudes in particular bearing in mind how supportive of 
the Community they were supposed to be. Asked to envisage a future 
scenario of a United Europe it was interesting that the Germans did 
not predict a single European Government, rather, they expected there 
to be a superordinate European Government fulfilling certain tasks 
with each country having a Government of its own to fulfil special 
45 governmental tasks of the country. Germans responded highly that 
they were proud to be German and opposed to the idea of a European 
46 flag, a European currency or even a European Olympic team. They 
may have expressed support for the European Parliament but they only 
believed that it should have the capacity to advise or make some 
d . . . 1 1' . h 1 47 ec1s1ons on 1nterna po 1t1cs not ave comp ete autonomy. Possibly 
due to their long-term experience of membership they did not believe 
that it would be impossible to unite Europe due to the language 
differences or that people would lose their cultural and national identity 
48 in a United States of Europe. However, the results of these surveys 
revealed, as Noelle-Neurnann suggested, no signs of a real enthusiasm 
for the European idea and as progress towards unification would require 
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"f" th d"d t "11" k "f" 49 sacr1 1ces, ere 1 no appear any w1 1ngness to rna e sacr1 1ces. 
There was also a breach in the belief in progress, a 1976 survey revealing 
that Germans expressed doubt of the existence of a United Western Europe 
50 by the year 2000 and between 1975 and 1978 they became pessimistic 
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about the general belief of mankind heading for a better future. 
They did not in 1976 believe that European cooperation had improved 
just that it had remained the same. 52 
Germans did not envisage a United States of Europe which would 
include the Russians and Eastern Bloc countries and nor did they 
53 
assume that anyone else would. It may well have been a correct 
assumption for in a Eurobarometer survey taken in 1980 both British 
. d . . h . 54 
and German c1tizens expresse m1strust 1n t e Russ1ans. Turning 
to a comparison of both British and German attitudes, the Eurobarometer 
surveys asked for opinions on the concept of a European passport, a 
European judicial area and European radio broadcasts. There was 
considerable acceptance of a European judicial area and passports too 
gained a favourable response, especially in Germany, but there was 
. . d. b d 55 no 1nterest 1n ra 10 roa casts. The granting of voting rights to 
residents of other member States in the European Elections produced 
a very divided response in Britain but acceptance in Germany where 
voting rights for Germans living abroad were to become more extensive 
h . . . 56 t an 1n Br1ta1n. Eurobarometer surveys into problems the Community 
was dealing with revealed that some common European policies were 
supported by both, particularly where they believed they would benefit, 
but Eurobarometer also picked up the fact that a common currency might 
57 be a bone of contention in Britain as well as Germany, and there 
was British opposition to an actual European Government. 
The Germans, according to Eurobarometer were evenly divided 
between wanting a national government only and those who wanted a 
European Government with the final say on certain issues (corroborating 
German findings of support for a government with limited powersJ. 58 
Carol and Kenneth Twitchett noted that not all the Community's measures 
had struck an unsympathetic chord in Britain but there was opposition 
to certain proposals such as attempts to introduce the Tachograph 
and a harmonized weight limit for heavy goods vehicles for example. 
I noted earlier that there was a tendency to blame the Community for 
events outside its control, one clear example being British citizens 
believing decimalization had been dictated by Community rnernbership. 59 
Inglehart said that supra-na~ional loyalties did exist in Germany 
and that people aged over 55 also displayed such loyalties in Britain. 60 
I noted earlier his view that for the British public, support for 
integration was far higher than their utilitarian assessment. In 
discussing post-materialism, he pointed out that in spite of the 
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existence of more post-materialist groups, support for European unification 
had not expanded in Europe and as I have noted there was a tendency 
to cling to traditional values and national institutions in both 
d . . 61 Germany an Br1ta1n. Germany was noticeably more 'European' 
oreintated towards the European Parliament and the work of the M.E.P.s 
but was unwilling to accept fundamental changes in certain basic aspects 
of German life. Inglehart pointed out that a sense of identification 
with one's horne town was widespread and ranked ahead of the nation 
in Germany thus the 'Nation' was by no means a universal focus of 
62 primary loyalty. Few people felt they belonged to 'Europe' or the 
'World' as a whole, but a third of the German public felt they belonged 
to a supra-national unit (as either first or second choice) as did 
28% of the British. Support for integration, he said, had a fairly 
strong correlation with one's sense of belonging and the British showed 
a relationship of comparable strength (to the original Six) because 
the question of Community membership had been a salient part of British 
politics for a long tirne. 63 
Political orientation was also a possible factor in determining 
attitudes to Europe. Inglehart and Rabier pointed out that the 
relationship between Left-Right political preferences and support for 
European integration was complex but in Germany the electorate of the 
Left was somewhat more favourable to the Community and to European 
solidarity than the electorate of the Right. However over 60% of those 
belonging to Left, Right or Centre political parties in Germany believed 
64 
that membership was good, whereas in Britain there was a cleavage. 
The differences politically were quite marked. Noelle-Neumann noted 
h b . f E h d . · 65 t 2 su Ject o urope a no part~san contours ~n Germany • 
In a 1978 German survey into attitudes into the dissolution of 
the Community 64% of the responses were pro-European and there was 
little difference amongst the political parties, all showing roughly 
h d . . b . f 66 t e same ~str~ ut~on o responses. British opinion polls revealed 
consistent cleavages however. According to Gallup poll findings in 
1976 and N.O.P. in 1977, for example, the bulk of support for Britain's 
membership came from those in the A/B/Cl social classes and from 
67 Conservative voters. Butler had pointed out that the middle class 
was more supportive of the Community than the working class and even 
the Liberals, the most ardent of Community supporters, were subject 
to volatility for in a May 1980 N.O.P. opinion poll into Community 
membership, support was lowest amongst Labour voters but only 38% of 
the Liberals were in favour (less than the Conservatives). 68 In 1975 
a Gallup poll according to Butler, reflected a change in support for 
the Community from 64% to 80% of Conservative voters and from 29% 
to 64% of Labour voters. There was a far less stable pattern of 
support in Britain than there was in Germany, the only persistent 
factor being that Market membership was more popular amongst men, 
amongst the young, and amongst the middle class and people in the 
South East. 69 However Noelle-Neumann noted a lack of support amongst 
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young Germans and there was an ambivalence to certain political 
70 
concerns amongst the Left. When asked which were important to 
them, Germans placed "To prevent Communist influences from advancing 
in Europe" in tenth position and "The Union of European States" in 
twentieth. Staving off Euro-Communism had a completely different 
71 
urgency than had the uniting of Europe. I noted that Germans placed 
stress on Community foreign relations and were concerned about German 
security. Perhaps these findings explained German keenness to remain 
within the Community. But growing conservatism was discouraging 
support for certain fundamental changes which would affect the German 
way of life. Neither Britain nor Germany could set aside instrumental 
attitudes, the British appearing to be demanding a return on their 
investment and neither was willing to make sacrifices. Each was 
interested in the benefits to them of Community actions not for the 
ideal ofthe.Community as a whole. Clearly some of the Community spirit 
had died in Germany although the groundswell of support for membership 
remained. Although more 'European' than the British, the Germans were 
qualifying their support for integration. Certainly economic and 
socio-political factors were having an impact on attitudes. 1960's 
research according to Noelle-Neurnann showed that the Germans reacted 
more sensitively to rising inflation than other people and clearly 
fear of economic problems was playing a part in their unwillingness 
to make sacrifices in the European cause; Nationalism and Traditionalism 
. . . 72 
were not just Br1t1sh prerogat1ves. 
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Chapter 5 
PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE COMMUNITY, 
THE MEDIA AND INFORMATION, EDUCATION 
Finally before considering the special cases of the 1975 British 
Referendum on Membership of the Common Market and the 1979 European 
Parliamentary Elections I would like to briefly analyse the extent 
of personal interest in the Community which existed in Britain and 
Germany, taking into consideration the effects or otherwise of the 
Media and how people felt about Media coverage of the Community and 
also if any marked differences existed in terms of educational attain-
ment which might have had an impact on the attitudes to the Community. 
According to Slater, in both old and new Community member States, 
there was a continuing high level of apathy towards the European 
88 
Community which showed all the signs of being on the increase. There was 
little public understanding of or interestin the Community and the work 
of the Community was not something which had captured the imagination 
or interest of the public. In addition where it had attracted public 
attention the publicity was all too often negative and there seemed little 
doubt that the drift of popular opinion had been towards a view of the 
1 
community and its institutions as increasingly remote. Bulmer, in 
comparing British and German political parties and the European Community, 
offered some interesting comparisons. His opinion was that in Britain 
electoral competition between political parties stimulated public debate 
on Community policy. Most Labour and Conservative M.P.s reacted to 
Community initiatives in terms of 'pro' and 'anti' stereotypes and in 
consequence parliamentary debate on Community initiatives was conducted 
within the adversarial traditions of the House of Commons. Looking at 
the Media he says that whilst Media coverage of party politics in the 
European Parliament was sparse, reports in Britain were couched primarily 
in terms of the 'pro' and 'anti' Community stereotypes. In Germany, 
in contrast, reports were less salient due to inter-party consensus and 
the absence of party conflict meant that policy initiatives from 
Brussels tended to be treated on their merits. Community initiatives 
were scarcely debated in the German lower house, the Bundestag, which 
conducted its work in committees whose work got little publicity. 
Thus, the institutional framework of the Bundestag and the consensual 
behaviour of the parties led to party attitudes being debated in a 
private arena away from public attention. 2 In conclusion, Bulmer 
argues that the political parties in Germany failed to mobilise the 
electorate over Community matters, the reasons for this lying in both 
the structure of Community policy-making and in the German party system. 
The behavioural patterns of the Bundestag permeated party policy-
making, and were thus ill-suited to arousing interest in the Community 
amongst the general public. German parties discussion of Community 
affairs was centred on the domestic institutional level which kept 
the discussion of Community issues away from public attention. 3 Handley, 
in discussing interest in the Community, looked at the findings of a 
country by country investigation and revealed that the highest levels 
of interest were to be found not in the original six member nations 
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(including Germany) but in the three new member States (including Britain) 
which, he said, was a direct function of the conflict and debate over 
. d h" 4 cont1nue members 1p. Blumler and Fox in discussing the level of interest 
in the 1979 European Election campaign said that, 
... the campaign was regarded as considerably less than 
riveting by many Community electors ••• and that the diffi-
culties of awakening widespread interest in the Elections 
were by no means confined to the new member States.S 
I shall look at interest in the Community Elections shortly but 
first I shall now compare the general level of personal interest in 
the Community as revealed by European Commission sponsored surveys 
undertaken between 1975 and 1978. The main observation was that in 
both Britain and Germany the major response was that people were 
interested a little in the Community; {from 48% up to 53% in Germany 
and from 42% up to 50% in Britain). Of those who claimed to be very 
interested there was a steady decline between 1975 and 1978 from 26% 
to 16% in Germany and from 35% to 19% in Britain. In Germany there 
was a slight upwards trend to 19% in 1980, but in Britain the rise 
amongst those saying they were very interested went up quite sharply 
to 25% {the third highest response out of the nine member nations. 6 
Opinion polls between 1977 and 1979 sought to measure public 
awareness of the European Elections before the event. The situation 
was different in Germany compared to Britain, for there was a sudden 
sharp rise in those saying they had recently heard or seen something 
about the European Parliament between 1977 and 1978, {from 33% to 
51%) then a steady increase up to 60%. In Britain, in contrast, there 
was a drop in awareness between 1977 and 1978 {from 58% to 44%) though 
7 by 1979 more people were aware and percentages rose to 55%. A survey 
which also compared the spontaneous mentioning of the Elections 
before June 1979 revealed a greater response over the years in general 
amongst the Germans from 18% in 1977 up to 46% in 1979, compared to 
fluctuations of around 20% up to 25% in Britain. However, when those 
people who had recently seen or heard something about the Parliament 
were interviewed, ability to mention the Elections was strikingly higher 
also in Germany, {from 54% up to 76%) compared with from 34% to 46% 
in Britain. 8 A few months later, after the Elections public awareness 
was measured in retrospect. Most people said that they had seen or 
heard something about the Parliament but far fewer in Britain (26%) 
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could remember what it was than in Germany (55%). Strikingly 45% compared 
with only 23% in Germany said that they had neither seen nor heard anything 
9 
or that they did not know. In fact far fewer in Britain {26%) than 
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in Germany (54%) could actually recall the Election. 10 Perhaps it 
should be borne in mind that in contrast to the 53% of the German 
public who, in 1979, considered the Election important, 60% of the 
British public public held the opposite viewpoint. 11 But nevertheless, 
over 50% in both nations did express prior interest in the Election 
12 
results. The situation was certainly not clear-cut in terms of 
level of awareness which draws into the discussion comparative attitudes 
to information about the Community itself and also to the purveyors 
of information, the Media. A 1975 survey revealed that in both nations 
personal interest in information on the Community matched the responses 
to interest in Community affairs, that people were interested a little. 
A May 1975 poll provided a more detailed look at attitudes as can be 
seen in Table 8.13 
Table 8 
Britain Germany 
I have no time for this and 24% (Agree) 41% (Agree) 
cannot be interested in 
everything at once 67% (Disagree) 52% (Disagree) 
The newspapers, radio and 58% (Agree) 34% (Agree) 
television do not say enough 
about European problems 36% (Disagree) 51% (Disagree) 
The newspapers, radio and 63% (Agree) 35% (Agree) 
television give only simple 
summaries of European problems 26% (Disagree) 44% (Disagree) 
European problems are reported 41% (Agree) 24% (Agree) 
in a biased manner 
34% (Disagree) 44% (Disagree) 
It was clear that the British were less satisfied with the level 
of information although the Germans were somewhat undecided on a couple 
of issues, including bias. 1975 was the year in which the British 
Referendum was held and clearly one might have expected a higher level 
of satisfaction in Britain due to the saturation of material. But the 
British did not appear happy with the content of the information they 
were receiving; they certainly did not appear unwilling to read or see 
it. Looking at criticism of the information in greater detail in 1976 
a list was drawn up stating the order of classification given to 
descriptions applied to information about the Community which is 
shown in Table 9 below: 14 
Table 9 
Britain Germany 
1: Complicated (65%) 1: Useful (55%) 
2: Useful (53%) 2: Complicated (54%) 
2a: Interesting (53%) 3: Interesting (45%) 
2b: Mainly bad news (53%) 4: Too rare (37%) 
5: Too rare (50%) 5: Mainly bad news (32%) 
6: Biased (39%) 6: Not interested (29%) 
7: Not interesting (33%) 7: Not biased (28%) 
8: Not useful (31%) 8: Biased (25%) 
9: Not biased (28%) 9: Mainly good news (24%) 
10: Too frequent (24%) 10: Simple (21%) 
11: Simple (21%) 11: Too frequent (19%) 
12: Mainly good news (15%) 12: Not useful (15%) 
It was clear that the British were less happy with the level of 
information they were receiving about the Community although even over 
50% of Germans complained that the information was complicated. 
Interestingly, 53% of the British public complained that the information 
presented was mainly bad news and a significant number, 39%, complained 
of bias. It is unfortunate that there is no indication of the nature 
of the bias which they alleged. Earlier in the thesis I made the point 
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that the British Media and the politicians were presenting the public 
with a negative viewpoint of the Community and clearly the public 
appeared'to be aware of this and did not like it. Noticeably, 50% also 
complained at the rarity of available information. The Germans were 
happier but not entirely, with a significant percentage also complaining 
that information was too rare and mainly bad news; in neither country 
were there many people complaining that the level of information was 
too frequent. Whilst the British were basically unhappy with the 
information which they received, the Germans were happier initially, 
but grew less happy as time went on. An opinion poll compared attitudes 
in 1976 and 1978 to the Media. In Britain there was little change in 
attitudes, as at each stage the British believed that the newspapers, 
radio and television did not say enough about European questions nor 
did they deal sufficiently seriously with them and indeed Herman and 
Lodge pointed to the fact that the British, together with the Italians 
were most dissatisfied of all member nations with information and also 
1 . d "f f" . 1" 15 comp a1ne o super 1c1a 1ty. Most Germans initially did think that 
the Media said enough about European questions but grew more undecided 
over the years and after disagreeing that the Media did not deal seriously 
with European questions, changed their minds and were divided, becoming 
16 
more critical than happy. Equally, in 1978, most people still disagreed 
with the idea that they had no time to seek information just as they 
had done in 1975. 17 In 1980 further questions were posed as to the 
adequacy of the available information. Both complained, with the British 
especially believing that they were insufficiently well informed about 
the problems being dealt with by the Community (74% compared with 52% 
. ) 18 1n Germany . Looking at the Media from a more general point of view 
both nations also complained that they were insufficiently well informed 
19 
about the different national and international problems. Which brings 
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me now to consider what the main sources of information were and 
which was the most popular. Two separate opinion polls in 1976 looked 
specifically at the Press and revealed firstly that over 60% of people 
in both nations read a daily newspaper but in terms of age the young 
were less avid readers, (especially young British women (54%) and 
German women (44%) who were the only groups below 69%). 55% of German 
men and women and 62% of British people read articles in the press 
about the Community and 61% of British people and 57% of Germans watched 
television broadcasts.20 
A further survey in 1980 looked at exposure to all three forms 
of Information Media, the Radio, Television and Daily Papers. Most 
British people watched the news on television every day and read the 
political news in the daily papers every day. They were slightly less 
avid radio-listeners as 44% said they listened to the radio on a 
daily basis with 22% saying they never listened. In Germany most people 
said they watched the news on television daily (although 27% watched 
just several times a week) and indeed when it cane to reading the 
political news in the daily papers and listening to the radio news they 
were very divided with about 44% saying they read or listened every day 
d d 24 . 1 . k 21 an aroun % JUSt severa t1mes a wee . A more detailed survey was 
also made in 1980 into their sources of information on the problems 
of the Community. A list is shown in Table 10. 22 
There was a distinct contrast in the two nations in terms of the 
percentage of people using the two main Media sources to obtain 
information and two other main differences: the fact that more British 
people gleaned information from talking with other people in contrast 
to Germans who gained information from magazines and periodicals, but 
in both nations the written word was a popular source of information. 
The most striking finding was the higher number of people who in Germany 
Television 
Daily Papers 
Radio 
Britain 
Talking with other people 
Magazines and periodicals 
Specialist publications 
Other 
Don't know 
Table 10 
(82%) 
(65%) 
{29%) 
(17%) 
8%) 
5%) 
2%) 
1%) 
Television 
Daily Papers 
Radio 
Germany 
95 
(62%) 
(44%) 
(25%) 
Talking with other people (12%) 
Magazines and periodicals (16%) 
Specialist publications 
Other 
Don't know 
8%) 
l%) 
( 13%) 
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responded 'Don't Know'. Handley commented that there was a greater 
1 1 f . t . c . ff . . . . 23 d 11 eve o 1n erest 1n ommun1ty a a1rs 1n Br1ta1n an Noe e-
Neumann also came to the conclusion that although data indicated 
support of the Community in Germany, interest in the Community and 
Community problems decreased as the 1979 Direct Elections approached 
(between 1973 and 1978). She pointed to the findings of a 1977 
survey which revealed, she said, how grossly boring the European 
machinery must have been for the German population. There might 
have been reasonable levels of internalized support and somewhat 
24 lower levels of interest but the level of knowledge was low. A 
question posed to German people in 1977 which asked whether people 
knew of the existence of a European Parliament revealed that a full 
63% of Germans either replied 'No' or 'Don't Know'; only 37% 
responded correctly. And of these 37%, only 16% were able to correctly 
identify the Bundestag as the appointing agency for German members 
f h l . 25 o t e European Par 1ament. 
To take an example of the level of British knowledge, Blumler 
drew attention to the fact that when the British were asked to say 
what were the most important issues to emerge during the European 
Election campaign, 51% of the sample were unable to name any; 21% 
referred to agricultural/fishery and food-surplus questions with 12% 
mentioning rising prices and the cost of living. Otherwise there was 
only a scatter of references to other topics which attracted less 
than 10% endorsement in every case. Among those who failed to vote, 
64 bl . . . 1 1 . . 26 % were una e to nom1nate a s1ng e e ect1on 1ssue. 
Herman and Lodge pointed out that the nature of the debate over 
the Elections might have led, especially in Britain to issue-confusion. 
They, in discussing the European Parliament and the Media, suggested 
that whilst press coverage of the Parliament's debates had increased, 
(since 1973), it had been inadequate and failed to reach mass audiences 
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and there had been limited press coverage by even the quality press. 
There had been a lack of coverage by the popular press and where there 
were 'good copy' items they often dealt with aspects of legislative 
proposals such as 'Euro-beer' or with items likely to raise public 
indignation. Only the most salient or controversial items were 
covered by the Media which were subject to the basic judgement that 
27 general images of the Parliament and its Members were not newsworthy. 
The high Media coverage given to Roy Jenkins, a renowned pro-Marketeer, 
when the new President of the Commission was, according to Herman and 
Lodge, related to general concern over the attitude of the 'recalcitrant' 
Labour Government and there was plenty of copy for those who wanted 
to speculate on whether his assumption of the Presidency would encourage 
a favourable change of attitude on the part of the British towards 
the Community. They argued that the Media was not only an important 
source of information but that it affected voting turn-out. It had 
been shown to be important in turning out many unaffiliated or weakly 
affiliated voters who, through exposure to the Media, voted for the 
candidate with whom they had become most familiar during the intensive 
d . . 28 Me 1a campa1gn. 
They also drew attention to the fact that readership of national 
dailies was higher in Britain than in other member States. On the 
continent, regional rather than national, and weekly rather than 
daily, papers might have been more influential in providing political 
. f . 29 1n ormat1on. This tied in with my analysis of the comparative sources 
of information which revealed that German people read the news on a 
daily basis and there was greater use of magazines and periodicals 
in Germany. Herman and Lodge also undertook a comparison of the 
Media in both nations and revealed that British radio and television 
coverage was higher than in other member States, regional companies 
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giving the European Parliament greater attention than national companies. 
They drew attention to the fact that such nominally European programmes 
actually included profiles of local politicians appointed to the 
European Parliament although they accepted that programmes of regional 
significance might help create public awareness indirectly. 30 
However, in analysing actual television coverage of the European 
Parliament's activities in 1976, they found that three sessions were 
covered by German television and seven by the British who were the 
only ones to film more than half the sessions. But there was no 
coverage by anyone of the session when the Parliament was preoccupied 
with the Community Budget and film coverage of some sessions was less 
than ten minutes. They noted a decline in coverage since 1975 although 
they a·ttributed this partly to national political developments such 
as the German Federal Elections. 31 
I have made the point at several stages of the fact that the 
Media coverage was not conducive to encouraging support for the 
Community in Britain but clearly also the Media coverage was not 
effective in reducing apathy to the Community or in adequately 
informing the publics of either nation who, although expressing some 
interest in being informed, were not having their wishes met. Herman 
and Lodge pointed out that Media coverage tended to vary with the 
newsworthiness of events taking place in the European Parliament, 
the 1975 British Referendum and the arrival of the Labour delegation 
h . . 1 d d. . 32 av~ng st~mu ate extra Me ~a ~nterest. The 1970s, as I have said, 
were dominated with inter-Community wrangles and the coverage or 
lack of it on the part of the Media clearly leads one to adopt the 
viewpoint that the Media had a distinctive influence in shaping 
attitudes, whether of indifference or apathy on the part of the 
Germans, or of dissatisfaction over information or criticism of 
Community membership in Britain. Attitudes to the problems the 
Community was tackling may have been influenced to quite a marked 
degree by the portrayal of them in the Media with the encouragement 
of a more instrumental position. 
I shall now turn my attention to the question of the level 
of education attained by the British and Germans and whether there 
were any marked differences. According to Inglehart and Rabier, 
••• amongst those individual characteristics that show 
substantial associations with support for European 
integration, education is probably the most pervasive •.. 33 
The highly educated were consistently more favourable than the less 
educated. It could be attributed to the fact that the more educated 
tended to have higher incomes and more desirable jobs or that education 
was linked with support for integration because the more educated 
respondents tended to be of higher social class level. However, they 
also argued that education is a complex variable that taps many things 
and is also an indicator or the presence or absence of certain 
cognitive skills. The more educated tended to move in different 
circles and read or viewed different Media and thus became exposed 
to different influences. The apparent impact of education on one's 
attitude proves, they say, to be stronger than the apparent impact 
of one's occupation and the fact remained that the more educated were 
consistently more favourable to European integration than the rest 
f h . . 34 o t e1r compatr1ots. Referring to the analysis of the adequacy 
of available information about the Direct Elections, Herman and Lodge 
pointed out that in 1977 dissatisfaction was highest amongst those 
people who had received more than an elementary school education 
who were also more likely to seek information about the Community. 35 
Handley in elaborating further on cognitive skills argues that the 
greater interest of the higher educated was mainly attributable to 
their higher level of cognitive mobilisation; because of their higher 
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awareness of social problems they are going to be interested in the 
Community in any case. However, he noted a downward trend in interest 
amongst the higher educated and with respect to the age factor, he 
refers to the fact that younger people were less interested in 
C . ff . 36 ommun1ty a a1rs. 
I shall briefly take a look at the age factor for according to 
Noelle-Neumann the younger generation was no more enthusiastic about 
Europe than the older generation and this lack of any more support 
amongst the young did not auger well for the future of the Community. 37 
Handley noted that in 1975 in four of the eight Community nations, 
the proportion of favourable responses was greater in the younger age 
group but by 1979 all but one country had a larger proportion of 
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favourable responses in the mature age-group. Age is indeed an important 
factor for, as Handley pointed out, the 35-54 age-bracket was the most 
active electorally with the highest level of turn-out and interest. 38 
I have already noted the lower level of readers in the younger German 
and British age groups and as we have seen the press was an important 
source of information on the Community. Perhaps one might possibly 
attribute the apparent growing apathy and continuous lack of knowledge 
to the disinterest on the part of many younger people? And clearly 
as we have seen, Media coverage itself did not help shape favourable 
attitudes to the Community. Looking at the mid-aged Handley suggested 
that the pro-European cohort of the 1960s (of Inglehart) was not 
39 
replaced by an equally or more pro-European group. It is an important 
point to bear in mind for many of these people would be the well-
educated who, increasingly appeared to express declining interest in 
the Community. Also the post-war generation were better educated than 
their pre-war counterparts yet apathy over Community affairs was growing 
and also a trend of growing adherence to 'traditional' values in the 
socio-political sphere was detected particularly amongst those under 
the age of 55 which did not auger well for the future of the Community 
in terms of change. 
Noelle-Neumann also detected a rise of conservatism in the 1970s 
especially in Germany although there was a slight decrease in 1978. 40 
The higher educated, according to Handley, tended to have a heightened 
sense of cosmopolitan identity and he discussed people's identification 
with Europe, referring to the 'learning to be European' process of 
Inglehart who had reported a higher level of supra-national identity 
amongst the original Six than amongst the Three in the early 1970s. 
Britain, he said, registered, (together with Ireland), the greatest 
increase in European identity though there was a corresponding increase 
in nation identity in Britain. At the end of the 1970s Britain 
(and Ireland) were well ahead of most of the Six in the proportion 
of European identifiers but in Britain this increase in European and 
nation identity was mostly amongst the 'other than' higher educated 
segment of the population. Germany alone saw a decrease among its 
higher educated group. Age played a part too for in the case of 
Britain almost all of the gain in increased identification with 
'Europe' and 'Nation' took place, according to Handley, among the 
55 and older age group for which he said there was no immediate 
1 . 41 exp anat1on. 
Having referred to discrepancies in terms of age and education 
I would now like to consider the findings of a 1978 opinion poll 
which compared the levels of education attained in Britain and Germany 
as shown in Table 11. 42 The most striking finding was clearly the 
high percentage of German men who continued their education at the 
age of 20 or beyond. Otherwise there was little difference between 
the nations in terms of the level of education attained, although 
fewer German men left school at the age of 15 or under than anyone else. 
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Table 11 
Age on Completion of Full-time Education 
Men: 
15 or under 
16 to 19 
20 or over or still studying 
Women: 
15 or under 
16 to 19 
20 or over or stil1 studying 
Britain 
58% 
30% 
12% 
57% 
31% 
12% 
Germany 
46% 
32% 
22% 
56% 
35% 
9% 
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Germany certainly appeared to have a better educated male population 
and yet, as surveys and political researchers have indicate·d, apathy 
had grown in Germany as much as in other member States and the higher 
educated were, as Handley noted, decreasingly 'European' and 'Nation' 
identifiers. 
The points made by Inglehart and Rabier, and also Handley~ into 
the linkage between level of education and cognitive mobilisation 
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would possibly suggest that the apathy and low level of interest and 
knowledge had more to do with the available information than unwillingness 
on the part of the public to inform themselves. As we have noted in 
detail there was criticism of the Media of both nations and, in looking 
at socio-political attitudes, it was clear that men, and some women, 
did discuss politics and joined organisations where politics might 
be discussed. Clearly the British might have been critical of their 
Community membership but early in the thesis I made the point that 
there was also a linkage between the negative impressions of the 
Community and Media coverage and there was also criticism of inter-
national news coverage in general. The 1970s were a difficult time 
economically and Guido Brunner, the German European Commissioner, 
said in 1978 that "The fact is that our European Community is 
predominantly regarded as an economic affair by the people in Europe." 43 
I have noted the tendency in both nations to grow more conservative 
and perhaps more instrumentalist. Could one not then suggest that 
a situation arose where reasonably or well-educated people were 
cognitively motivated to absorb information but that the available 
information and the attitudes of politicians coupled with the political 
framework both in the Community and at home, encouraged both nations 
to adopt a short-term viewpoint towards the Community which emphasised 
economic gain rather than generating a positive commitment to the 
European ideal in the long-term? 
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Chapter 6 
·THE 1975 BRITISH REFJ:;RENDUM ON COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP 
I will now make a brief analysis of the 1975 British Referendum 
on Community Membership. As Butler said, it offered not only the 
most serious test of attitudes to Europe in Britain, but also one 
of the most spectacular general examples of the volatility of public 
opinion, with the public responsive to strong cues from the political 
parties. 1 According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, it was as 
if the campaign had never taken place at all within two months of the 
Referendum vote. The total vote itself was 67.2% in favour and 32.8% 
opposed and according to the Economist, the geographical spread of 
the vote and the adherence of the main party political leaderships 
with substantial sections of their followers to the Community made 
the Community a non-partisan issue in the then current mainstream of 
1 . . 2 po ~t~cs. Shepherd, in discussing party identification and opinions 
towards entry prior to the Referendum, commented that of particular 
interest to pro-Marketeers was the close correlation which existed 
3 between party identification and opinions towards British entry. 
Gallup opinion polls showed that as British entry became more closely 
identified with a Labour Government's policy, so Conservative voters 
became increasingly hostile to the idea of entry. 4 Harold \~ilson 
kept the prospect of entry on the political agenda between 1964 and 
1970 and a vociferous anti-Europe strand within the Labour movement 
helped to legitimise Labour voters' growing opposition to entry in 
the 1960s. In the 1970s the Labour Party had come to emphcsise a 
more populist philosophy, thus the people should be allo~ec to decide 
directly on membership. Shepherd noted that Labour's elect~ral support 
came mainly from the working-class who achieved high rati~qs in a 
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'conservatism' index and attitudes of patriotism and opposition 
to new ideas were typical of Labour voters. 5 According to Alderson, 
Britain ''s entry into the Community, " ••• was contingent and paradoxically 
became a serious electoral issue only after the event." 
Enoch Powell in a speech in Stockport in 1973 opened the 
Pandora's Box when he called on anti-Community Conservatives to vote 
Labour because the Labour Party would offer the people a free choice 
in a referendum, or in a General Election devoted to Community 
membership. When the Conservative Government of Edward Heath lost 
the February 1974 General Election some said that it was partly due 
to Enoch Powell's comments on membership which influenced voters. 6 
The Common Market, according to SMrlvik. , Crewe, Alt and Fox, played 
a subsidiary issue role in the campaign both in its own right and in 
the discussion about the causes of increasing food prices. 7 They 
pointed out that in the findings of opinion polls there was a 
partisan differentiation within the electorate with Conservative 
voters more positive to the Community issue than voters from other 
parties though amongst Conservatives most people thought the terms 
should be changed. The polls showed that in the Spring of 1974 the 
British were less than 'glad' about the fact that Britain had ever 
joined the Community; there was a widespread feeling that Community 
membership had been conducive to an increase in the cost of living. 
However, they pointed out that there emerged a majority in the 
electorate who were willing to accept continued membership provided 
the terms of membership could be improved. 8 Shepherd drew out the 
point made by Butler and Stokes that on issues which people perceived 
as being of low salience they sought guidance from their respective 
9 party leaders. sgrlvik et al. pointed out that whilst an over-
whelming majority of the electorate had a reasonably realistic under-
standing of what the two major parties were standing for on the 
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Community issue, the Liberal Party was less clearly identified with 
any definite policy. 10 Looking at voting support in February 1974 
they showed that voters who switched from Conservative to Liberal 
were less favourable to the Community than stable Conservative voters 
and those who switched from Labour to Liberal were more positive to 
the Community than stable Labour voters thus opinion was most 
f bl h . . . 11 avoura e to t e Commun1ty amongst cons1stent Conservat1ves. In 
August 1974 there was a Gallup poll published which asked people how 
they would vote if the Government negotiated new terms for Britain's 
membership. In reply, 54% said they preferred to stay in the 
Community which perhaps was a foretaste of the future, also demonstrating 
as I said earlier, that if possible the British preferred to compromise 
11 f h . . d. 1 12 rather than pu out o t e Commun1ty 1mme 1ate y. S~rlvik et al. 
commented that the result of the Referendum in the end came as no 
surprise, the opinion polls during the previous two months having 
consistently predicted a decisive majority for Britain's staying in 
the Community apart from Scotland where the outcome had been more 
doubtful and indeed the result showed less impressive majorities in 
13 Ulster and Scotland. They analysed the factors which they considered 
determined the outcome and commented that they had stressed that the 
part of the electorate which had unconditionally wanted Britain to 
withdraw was really a small minority. The pre-conditions for a 
substantial 'Yes' majority were already formed, provided the Wilson 
Government could convince the bulk of its voters that staying in the 
Community was what a Labour voter should vote for. 14 They believed 
that after the completion of Britain's negotiations and when the 
Wilson Cabinet had announced its decision (with some dissenters) to 
recommend the voters to confirm Britain's membership, the final balance 
of strength between the 'Yes' and 'No' sides must have emerged almost 
110 
. 1 15 1nstantaneous y. An opinion poll made it clear that the Government 
could count not only on a 'Yes' majority in the electorate but also 
16 in Labour's voting support. Opinion polls at the end of 1974 revealed 
that the overall decision on the Community remained fairly stable 
and a picture was drawn up of a public which, whilst not actually 
wanting to leave the Community was not particularly happy to have 
. . d . . h 17 JOlne lt e1t er. Expectations about the benefits of membership 
were not overwhelming but very few people expected Britain to leave 
at the end of negotiations. Spence pointed out that the public 
became rather more aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Community in comparison to those of Britain once Britain had become 
18 
a member. A 1973 O.R.C. poll showed that few people believed 
Britain had a higher standard of living than other Community countries 
and more people believed that Community countries had longer holidays, 
higher wages and more influence in the world than Britain. 19 People 
.had grown ready to accept by 1974 that membership of the Community 
was not the main contributor to the rise in the cost of living 
and that re-negotiation was an attractive alternative to leaving the 
Community. The polls showed those most opposed to membership being 
the old, the Scots, the working-class, Labour supporters, women and 
20 in addition, young people. In the Referendum campaign pro-Marketeers 
turned their attentions squarely on working-class women, Scottish 
voters and 18-24 year olds. An N.O.P. opinion poll in 1975 revealed 
that 80% of professional and senior administrative A./B.s were in 
favour of continued membership, dropping through 66% of Cls, 50% of 
21 
the C2s to only 41% of the D/E.s. 
One of the big questions hanging over the Referendum campaign 
was how well the public .felt informed. According to Spence only a 
minority in 1975 felt informed and an O.R.C. poll concluded that 
"as an exercise of political persuasion, the Common Market Referendum 
campaign must be considered as something of a flop." 22 The evidence 
of opinion polls over the years showed an electorate conscious of 
its lack of information on many crucial issues, inclined to be 
agnostic and were waiting for a lead in the Referendum campaign but 
they realised no united lead would emanate from political leaders. 
Throughout the campaign the Cabinet was divided, the political parties 
were divided as were the experts and television was seeking to be 
23 balanced. According to Spence, the facts presented to the public 
were mutually contradictory, the specialists' views were emotionally 
loaded and whether Britain should remain a member was a matter of 
opinion. 24 Looking at the campaign itself, people were, according to 
Hedges, aware of the leaflets and two thirds of people interviewed 
claimed to be either very or fairly interested in the campaign. 
Whether the information people received was very helpful was somewhat 
doubtful for as Hedges pointed out, more than a third felt that they 
had not received the information they wanted and a fifth found it 
difficult to understand. Most people got their information from the 
television and from reading the newspapers although almost a quarter 
gained information from friends and relatives. 25 Grimond and Neve 
drew attention to the fact that collective Cabinet responsibility was 
suspended and Cabinet ministers were allowed to differ in public. 
Prime Minister Wilson wrote letters to the anti-Market Ministers saying 
they were free to campaign against the Cabinet recommendation so long 
. 1' . h 26 as they d1d not oppose Government po 1cy 1n t e N.E.C. Thus the 
public was faced by groups of politicians from all sides of the 
political spectrum getting together in opposing groups, seeking to 
put their respective messages across. The picture was more confused 
by the fact that leading politicians such as Mrs. Thatcher, Mr. Wilson 
and Mr. Callaghan did not operate within the rival organisations. 
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According to Butler and Kitzinger none of the people involved in 
the battle had a strong sense that the particular themes were going 
through and pro- and anti-Marketeers commented on their sense of 
boredom with their own speeches. 27 There was nothing new to say. 
The effect on the public was most interesting. Butler and Kitzinger 
acknowledged the press reports which made it plain that the public 
finally switched on in the last ten days of the campaign with 
attendance at meetings and the general level of interest increasing, 
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but after the campaign nearly two thirds of people questioned believed 
the amount of coverage had been too much and devastatingly there was 
a large shift in interest as the campaign wore on; most of those 
initially interested became bored and a large minority of the 
. d b . 28 un~ntereste ecame ~nvolved. 
There was an increase in knowledge about the countries 
comprising the Community and according to Hedges, the increase was 
evenly spread between different population groups, (manual workers 
29 having to catch up). Butler and Kitzinger commented that it was not 
clear just how the public saw the European issue; few electors saw 
themselves as recording a judgement on the success or otherwise of 
re-negotiation but the main issue was not how much the terms had 
30 
altered, but whether Britain should stay in or get out. The 
background situation was difficult with the Commonwealth becoming 
less reliable as a means of support. Many reasons for their vote 
were given by people as Hedges discovered. 
There were comments of "We can't stand alone".and "The way 
the world is going it is better for Britain to be in a larger community" 
which would suggest a desire for security. Some comments ran on the 
theme of "Even if we weren't too keen to get in, why bother to get 
31 
out?" In discussing European integration, I questioned the British 
resolve to leave the Community and Hedges pointed to an important 
factor, that of the basic conservatism of the British public and its 
resistance to change even when the change might be desirable. When 
there isn't any solid reason for changing, he said, the British vote 
for the status quo, (and one may recall the growing conservatism plus 
attachment to national institutions in the 1970s). Prior to 1973 
the status quo was outside Europe; after than it was inside. 32 
commented on the remarks of a respondent who said that, 
the Referendum should have been held years ago and 
we wouldn't have gone in ••• but the British people 
don't like change so it was a foregone conclusion. 
He 
The man was anti-Europe but his views summarised this point of view. 
Other comments indicated to Hedges a feeling of when you have 
started something you shouldn't give up without a fair trial and 
much comment was made about the money it would involve to leave 
and the loss of dignity. A key argument ·was that of the loss of 
sovereignty but, as Hedges pointed out, issues on which Britain's 
policies and practices had to be aligned to the Community were not 
of a kind to catch the public's imagination and the consequences of 
33 loss of sovereignty were not yet seen as burdensome. 
Butler and Kitzinger, in assessing the opinion poll results 
prior to the Referendum itself believed that opinion polls have 
most effect on elections when the outcome is not in doubt. The 
fact that the Referendum campaign did not live up to the expectations 
that it would be bitter was due to the polls foreshadowing a 2:1 
34 
outcome. An N.O.P. poll also revealed a tendency on the part of 
35 
anti-Marketeers not to vote in contrast to pro-Marketeers. Pierce, 
Valen and Listhaug argued that partisanship was the dominant factor 
36 in the Referendum vote. Bristow also makes the comment that there 
was a clear association between industrialisation and the proportion 
of electors voting against continued membership. 37 And as was the 
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case, there was a lower vote in favour in industrial areas than in 
the Shires though, as Pierce et al. commented, there was a centre-
38 periphery aspect to the Referendum. Butler and Kitzinger, in looking 
at the final Gallup poll, revealed that in every sub-group there was 
a comfortable 'Yes' vote with the working class and the young yielding 
most 'No' votes. These were groups where Labour predominated and where 
. t t h d b 1 Th 1 1 . 1 . d . 3 9 1n eres a een east. ey were a so ess 1nc 1ne to vote. 
Perhaps these people were least satisfied with the information, for 
Hedges noted that whilst voters and non-voters read the available 
literature, therewasonly a slightly increased tendency to read 
leaflets which coincided with people's outlook and the tendency 
to read the literature was only marginally higher amongst non-manual 
40 
workers. Butler and Kitzinger, elaborating on the saliency of 
issues said it was notable that on more abstract issues the public 
approved most of Community membership whilst thinking less of it on the 
d h . 41 more own to eart 1ssues. According to M.O.R.I. high prices were 
the dominant consideration for withdrawing whilst fears of isolation 
d . bl h h. f . 42 an econom1c trou e were t e c 1e pressures to stay 1n. 
There was a feeling of ignorance, notably amongst Labour 
voters and this was possibly demonstrated by the fact that special 
interviews were arranged with the 'Sun' and 'Daily Mirror' newspapers 
after it was pointed out that a large proportion of the uncommitted 
were Labour voters and many of them were confused about the stand of 
h . . . 43 t e Pr1me M1n1ster. Certainly in almost all aspects, according to 
Butler and Kitzinger the electorate was remarkably homogeneous in its 
reactions, the voters most open to persuasion being disproportionately 
44 
working-class and female. They were not concentrated in any 
particular region however and those who worried most about unemployment 
were the D.E. groups who were most likely to be affected. One other 
factor might have been, as King pointed out, that dislike of certain 
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anti-Marketeers such as Benn, Foot and Shore, probably brought many 
Labour voters into the pro-Market camp early in the campaign and if 
'· 
they were unpopular amongst Labour voters, they were even more 
1 . d . b 45 unpopu ar amongst Conservat1ves an L1 erals. He also reiterated the 
point that sovereignty was only of intense interest to a small minority 
and anti-Marketeers had to contend with the view that it was risky 
for Britain to leave as she was only a small country and could not 
. 1 46 go 1t a one. Possibly in view of the campaign being conducted at 
a time of economic difficulty internationally, the British believed 
that it was economically advantageous for Britain to be part of a 
larger trading unit. The voters expressed a cautious attitude thus 
corroborating Hedges' comments that in the last analysis the British 
47 
would favour the status quo. 
In summing-up Butler and Kitzinger commented that the verdict 
of. the electorate had to be kept in perspective. It was unequivocal 
but also unenthusiastic, support for membership being wide but not 
deep. The Referendum was not a vote cast for new departures or bold 
initiatives but for the status quo and anti-Marketeers would have 
had a better chance of winning a Referendum on the issue of entry not 
departure. Far from reflecting high-minded idealism however, about 
the European fraternity, most electors seemed to have voted in the 
spirit outlined by Sir Christopher Soames, that "This is no time 
to consider leaving a Christmas C:lub, let alone the Common Market." 
The Referendum did not gird people's loins for a new European adventure 
for throughout the rest of 1975 there was little evidence that the 
. . d d48 Government had become. more Commun1ty m1n e and as the Economist 
Intelligence Unit said, it was as if the campaign had never taken 
49 place. 
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Chapter 7 
THE 1979 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 
In 1976 the Council of Ministers made a decision to implement 
the 1975 Rome Summit decision and hold the European Elections within 
May and June 1978. In the event, it was decided to postpone the 
Elections until 1979. However, it proved impossible to agree on a 
common day or common electoral system and the British, (and three 
other member nations) noted on 7 June 1979 and the rest, (including 
Germany), on 10 June with only the English, Scots and Welsh not voting 
by proportional representation. Fitzmaurice, commenting on the timing 
of the Election, pointed out that the timing created difficulties in 
Britain, the General Election having taken place shortly before and 
the political parties mounted an almost token campaign as a result, 
with the voters more apathetic in consequence. 1 
According to Lodge, what the member Governments did not see when 
they failed to observe the 1978 date, was that a 
••• confluence of national, regional, and local elections 
and referenda with the European Elections might result in 
political parties being unable or insufficiently imagina-
tive to campaign on different issues for each of the 
elections, or result in national elections being 
Europeanised.2 
Indeed, as she commented further, the Community figured prominently 
in the General Election as a scapegoat ~or Britain's economic ills 
and, with the advent of the European Election campaign, the electorate 
faced the prospect of a lengthy debate without much change in the 
issues. In the end, she said, part of the electorate wondered 
whether it was participating in another Referendum on British membership 
. 1 . 3 ln the E ectlons. 
The response of the British electorate to the European Elections 
was one of apathy. In some respects the European contest resembled a 
General Election; the same electoral system was used, the familiar 
political parties contested the Election and, apart from the 
Liberal.Party, made little reference to their continental allies. 4 
Fitzmaurice drew attention to the fact that national elections 
played an important role in both Germany and Britain. In Germany, 
Federal Elections were due in 1980, and it was vital for the F.D.P. 
(Liberals) to keep above the 5% mark and for the coalition parties 
to hold at least 50% of the vote. In Britain, with the European 
Elections coming only a month after the General Election, it was 
too early to expect any real change. Labour was demoralised and 
divided about Europe and for many leaders and local militants in 
the Labour movement there was outright opposition to participating 
in the Elections at a11~ 5 Lodge made an analysis of the electoral 
campaigns in the two nations which were noticeably different. As 
in other large member States, attention was paid to regional 
inteiests in Germany; there were a wide variety of activities 
including street theatre sponsored by the Europa-Union and specially 
created LMnder committees for the European Elections. Realisation 
of the information programme was greatly assisted by the enthusiastic 
support of national and LMnder governments and bodies. Commenting 
that the early and positive involvement of political parties would 
prove to be a crucial factor in getting the vote out she drew 
attention to the underlying commitment to European integration and 
the governing parties support of direct elections in Germany whereas 
in Britain the periods immediately prior to the parties' campaigns 
and the General Election were conspicuous for their lack of novelty. 
Despite the fact that two special offices were set up in Manchester 
and Birmingham to bring the Community closer to the people and despite 
the fact that there were permanent Community press and information 
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offices in Edinburgh and C~rdiff, the Community's visibility did 
not appear to be noticeably improved. None of them managed to 
generate enthusiasm amongst the British general public for the 
l . 6 European E ect1ons. 
Lodge made reference to the fact that the turnout was considered 
disappointing by national standards in Germany as well as in Britain 
(65.9% compared with 90.7%.in German Federal Elections; 32.4% compared 
with 76% in British General Elections). European Election turnout 
was lower in other member States also. 7 Blumler and Fox pointed out 
that the involvement of voters in the Elections was problematic 
from the start. The decision to hold the elections was a deliberate 
measure of political engineering in the hope of increasing Community 
consciousness among mass publics, but it was always doubtful whether 
the Election process would overcome popular indifference. In spite 
of cross-national currents of party cooperation, the campaigns were 
waged through national systems and Media and it was doubtful if much 
voter interest could be aroused by an election which was ambiguously 
straddled by a mixture of system levels. It was always possible that 
reduced partisan and media commitment would result in weaker voter 
and audience involvement and against this background they argued, it 
8 
was not surprising that the turnout was lower. 
Looking at support for the idea of the European Elections, 
European Commission sponsored opinion polls revealed that in 1976 
there was strong support for direct elections in Britain as much as 
in Germany. However, I noted that they had different views on the 
roles of the political parties, the British wanting the political 
parties to campaign under national banners, the Germans preferring 
political parties to get together. 
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Blumler and Fox noted that the campaign for the Elections 
was regarded as less than ri veti.ng by many Community electors. In 
a separate analysis they commented on people's reactions to the 
Media campaigns which were waged in Britain and Germany, noting the 
German television campaign evoked a positive response whereas the 
British campaign provoked more complaint than appreciation. German 
broadcasters were, for example, determined to give the campaign a 
fully 'European' flavour, an emphasis which they said, succeeded 
apparently for exceptionaily large minorities of Germans said 
afterwards that the programmes, "showed me where my party stands on 
European questions" and "showed me how the European Community is run". 
In Britain in contrast, viewers complained more often than any other 
nation of feeling "confused". Many British viewers complained that 
their television networks had paid too little attention to the 
Election. In Germany there was more complaint of too much attention 
1 0 0 9 by the te evlslon. Blumler and Fox suggested that the British 
reaction to the Media campaign reflected not only their awareness 
of objectively low levels of party and broadcasting activity but 
also some frustration over having been asked to vote in an election 
10 
with very little information to guide them. Lodge noted, in 
considering the issues in the British campaign that there seemed 
little difference between the Conservative and Labour parties, both 
apparently wanting reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy, Community 
Budget, and fishing policies although the Conservatives had detailed 
proposals and a more positive stance on what the Community offered 
0 0 d h 1 f h 1° 11 Brltaln an t e ro e o t e European Par lament. 
Blumler referred to the comments of a British news editor 
who remarked that "compared with a General Election, we have to 
start from a much lower leyel of prior awareness and knowledge in 
members of ~he public about European affairs" and came to the conclusion 
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that broadcasters in other States were less constrained than their 
British colleagues by the perceived insularity of their audience and 
were le~s obliged to assume a starting-point of zero-knowledge about 
1 . . 12 European po 1t1cs. Lodge, in analysing the failure of the·information 
campaigns to generate interest amongst the British pu.blic, commented 
on the fact that one of the reasons for low interest and apathy might 
have been the fact that the press advertisements did not make for 
scintillating reading in contrast to the rousing German campaign 
where there were television advertisements calling on voters to use 
13 
their votes. I have commented in detail earlier in the thesis on 
the respective attitudes and expectations of the publics of Germany 
and Britain to the Elections and to the European Parliament and 
brought out the fact that national interests were very prevalent in 
both nations though the Germans were more 'European' minded. Noting 
this, Blumler and Fox pointed out that the Germans viewed the Elections 
in terms of greater European cooperation, in contrast to the British 
preoccupation with agricultural issues which was clearly a concern 
b . 1 1 1' . 14 a out European agr1cu tura po 1c1es. 
Both nations revealed very contrasting reactions in terms of 
level of interest in the Elections. Germany, of all the Community 
countries, stood out in having experienced the most invigorating 
election campaign and the German electors were highest in campaign 
interest, exposure and evaluation as well as voting turn-out and they 
performed creditably as regards issue awareness also. The British 
were at the other extreme in that British efforts elicited consistently 
low-key responses from many electors who tended to lack interest in 
the campaign, followed it cursorily, gave low marks to television 
. . 
15 1 1 d coverage and had l1ttle to say about the 1ssues. B urn er an 
Fox also commented that the pro-European Germans managed to name 
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Election issues whereas British electors could think of few issues 
h h d d f h . 16 t at a emerge rom t e campa1gn. 
Ari I.T.N. Press Information Bulletin offered an interesting 
insight into British attitudes. Taken after polling, it commented 
that the main reason people stayed at home was that they just did 
17 
not know what it was all about. According to Blumler and Fox 
some British broadcasters did concede that they might have under-
estimated the appetite of audiences for campaign material and "helped 
to make the Election not only dull but incomprehensible." 18 Inglehart 
and Rabier discussed interest in the Elections and noted that rising 
public support was manifest for a directly-elected parliament and 
that there were absolute majorities supporting the idea by 1977. 
Commenting on the fact that the Community publics were not very 
aware of the Elections they noted that Britain was an extreme case. 
Six weeks before, in a Gallup opinion poll, only 55% said that 
they had heard or seen anything about the European Parliament, 25% 
were able to mention the Elections, although one week before, the 
British were noticeably better informed with 42% now able to mention 
h 1 . 19 t e E ect1ons. Ironically, in 1977, far more British people had 
believed that it was important to go and vote in the Elections than 
had the Germans; in Germany there were fluctuations in determination 
to vote over the years although the basic fundamental determination 
to vote was there. In Britain in contrast, after being at comparable 
German levels for many years, there was a drop in 1979 amongst those 
20 determined to vote and indeed there was a low turn-out. Ironically 
the British recollection of voting was markedly higher by about 20% 
compared to those who had actually voted. In Germany the difference 
. 1 21 
was marg1na . Butler also noted the earlier British determination 
to vote. A May 1978 opinion poll revealed that 45% had said that 
they would certainly vote and 27% that they probably would, which 
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was fairly typical for the Community as a whole. 22 
Rabier and Inglehart held the view that the fact that the British 
Labour Party failed to conduct any campaign worth mentioning had more 
to do with the low rate of turn-out. They noted that the information 
level of Labour Party supporters was about ten points lower than that 
of Liberals and Conservatives which was probably a reflection of the 
fact that the latter parties made an effort to mobilise their electorate. 
They drew attention to opinion polls which revealed that 89% of Germans 
in comparison with 47% of Britons were able to mention the Elections 
even though they had not noticed it, (40% of the British) and 68% 
of Germans had read or heard something about the European Parliament 
though they could not specify the Elections, (38% of the British). 23 
Dreyfus pointed out, commenting on the size of the audiences for the 
electoral debates which were broadcast, that there was a lack of 
enthusiasm in Germany as well as Britain over the electoral campaign. 
But there was a fundamental difference in approach to the Elections 
24 
too. 
As Blumler and Fox noted, the national campaigns gave rise to 
different issues, and reflected that German electors were unique in 
mentioning the need for further cooperation more than any other 
issue and also to a lesser extent saw the Election in terms of rival 
ideological visions of the future. In contrast, 45% of the British 
0 h 0 1 1 10 0 25 were concerned w1t agr1cu tura po 1c1es. Butler and Marquand 
commented that in contrast to the race between the Christian Democrats 
and Socialists in Germany the difficulties which faced Labour 
candidates had unexpected echoes in the Conservative Party in that 
it was difficult to arouse interest in a campaign where, they said, 
one of the contestants had largely withdrawn. The absence of a 
Labour campaign was damaging according to a successful Conservative 
candidate. Commenting still further on British attitudes they noted 
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that the voters were not choosing the future Government of Europe 
and everyone knew it. They could not .see what relevance the Parliament 
h d d 1 f th 1 . . . f . 26 a an were on y aware o e 1m1tat1ons o 1ts powers. Inglehart 
and Rabier made the point that those individuals with pro-European 
27 
attitudes were more likely to vote and as Dreyfus commented, the 
Labour Party, which contained few 'Europeans' suffered a very high 
f b . 28 1 percentage o a stent1ons. But er and Marquand also suggested that 
a more strident Labour campaign might have stimulated working-class 
29 Conservatives to vote as well as working class Labour supporters. 
Commenting on partisanship in Britain, Blumler and Fox noted that 
Conservatives developed more interest in the campaign, followed it 
more avidly, and voted more often than did Liberal supporters who 
were, in turn, more involved than Labour supporters. They also noted 
a tendency for relatively weak or irregular associations between age 
and campaign interest to crystallise into stronger relationships when 
the turnout was examined and this was marked in Britain and among 
. 1 30 German Soc1a Democrats. Also German findings provided a good 
example for the appearance of an influence of election exposure on 
turnout to become much stronger at lower levels of interest in the 
campaign as most of the 'very' and 'quite' interested Germans voted 
but, noticeably, amongst those not at all interested, turn-out rose 
31 from 21% to 73%. Drawing further on the age-factor, Blurnler and 
Fox made two points. First, Britain was typical of a case where 
older electors may have been drawn to voting less through promptings 
of interest than through life-long socialisation to the habit of voting. 
Secondly, the British were more likely to hold pro-European attitudes 
if they supported the Conservative Party, had stayed at school longer, 
32 
were males and of greater age. Inglehart and Rabier commented on 
the low electoral participation in the Elections by British workers, 
(predominantly Labour voters). 33 The Germans deviated in terms of 
age for whereas youthful abstent'ion was widespread throughout the 
Community, the more particular failure of older Germans to vote might 
have reflected their generational detachment from the pro-European 
mood of the post-war period. With respect to gender, a dutiful 
outlook on voting which mainly characterised older people was in 
Germany a feature of male electors. (Note, the lower numbers of older 
male Germans alive in contrast to older women.) 34 
Finally, in Germany and Britain pro-Marketeers were reached 
127 
by more channels of communication than were anti-Marketeers and Britain 
stood out, according to Blumler and Fox, as the only country where 
opponents were less likely to have participated than those who 
considered the Community 'neither good nor bad'. In Germany turn-
out among opponents was nearly 20% lower than among supporters; in 
Britain the difference was 37%. 35 As Herman and Lodge noted, two 
Labour voters abstained for every Conservative whereas Germans were 
36 
more pro-European. In contrast to British hostility to supra-
national conceptions, Dreyfus, and also Herman and Lodge, noted 
the fact that the major German parties were enthusiastically pro-
d d 0 1 0 37 European an approve supra-nat1ona concept1ons. The British were, 
in general, less supportive of Community membership and, as Blumler 
and Fox said, those who were clear in their minds that membership 
was a bad thing abstained even more frequently than people who 
responded 'Don't Know'. In contrast, in other European countries, 
it was the 'Don't Knows' who were less inclined to vote than respondents 
0 h 0 0 38 1n any ot er op1n1on category. 
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CONCLUSION 
A very widely held view was expressed by Bibes, Menudier, 
de la Serre and Smouts who wrote that Germany was rightly considered 
to be one of the most pro-European countries in the Community, being 
willing to consider supra-national solutions and not opposing the 
idea of a possible extension of the powers of the European Assembly 
elected by universal suffrage. Party squabbles did not disguise the 
broad consensus between the parties on the need to unify Europe and 
on the way Europe should be organised and there was agreement in 
explaining to the voters in the European Election campaign that 
Germany gained many advantages from the Community which fully 
justified their commitment to it. 1 
Contrast this with their opinion of Britain where they 
questioned whether they could speak of a 'national' attitude towards 
Europe when it was in Britain that the principle of Community 
membership aroused the most passionate divisons? Rather than 
experiencing a positive attraction towards the European ideal, the 
British felt it was important not to be excluded from the Continental 
group on their doorstep in order that they could influence its 
development. The British remained unwilling Europeans and after 
more than five years of membership, the preparations, events and 
results of the European Election showed that Britain was not a 
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European country like the others. 2 Public opinion was disposed to 
blame the Community for many of Britain's ills, as the opinion polls 
confirmed and there existed, they added, a specifically British approach 
both pragmatic and defensive in its view of Europe with regard to 
the development of the institutions and policies of the Community. 
The Europe the parties envisaged was one of cooperation not integration. 3 
But not all commentators agreed completely. Marwick, for 
example, commenting on British attitudes to Europe, wrote that 
despite the Referendum, it was not easy to generalise on British 
attitudes, 
••• but without doubt, in the middle seventies, there 
were many manifestations of closer contact with Europe 
and of a greater cosmopolitanism allied perhaps with 
greater insecurity and less insular pride.4 
The evidence I have presented in the thesis suggests that in the 
period 1975-1980, the situation was not, in some respects, as 
straightforward as the above statements might suggest. Certainly 
Germany was more supportive of Community membership and was more 
favourably disposed to the developments in the Community especially 
in terms of further integration. Much of their established attitudes 
were probably due to the actual experience of over twenty years of 
membership and yet there were some question marks which could be 
posed over their attitudes especially with regard to the length of 
their membership. They increasingly showed insecurity in terms of 
their future prosperity and position though they were keen supporters 
of Community action. But there was a clear worry about there 
being any detrimental effects on Germany herself. Nationalism was 
evident however much there was a desire for integration. It might 
not be incorrect to suggest either that it was selfish reasons of 
desire to resurrect herself from the ashes of War which brought her 
into the Community in the first place and she certainly enjoyed a 
leadership role within the Community. Therefore was it surprising that 
she continued to manifest instrumentalist attitudes? Bibes et al. 
did refer to German nationalism. They noted that in the (European) 
Election campaign traditional conflicts over domestic political issues 
arose in just the same way as in a normal legislative election. 5 
Attitudes in Britain appeared to be still those of the Winston Churchill 
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quote that "We are with them, but not of them". 6 Bibes et al. 
comment on the British desire for cooperation did, I would argue, 
reflect'·British attitudes; cooperation with their Community colleagues 
in order to get a good (in their eyes) deal for Britain. 
I made a specific effort in the thesis to compare socio-political 
attitudes and I do not believe they were irrelevant. The 1970s was 
a period of great economic uncertainty and one cannot discount the 
effect on people's willingness or unwillingness to support Community 
issues. Depressed personal feelings were manifest and even Germany, 
in spite of her wealth, was not excluded. Social factors too played 
their part in determining attitudes as did the conscious or unconscious 
absorption of the attitudes of politicians. A major British criticism 
was lack of information about the Community. It manifested itself 
clearly in the European Election campaign but as we have seen was 
evident throughout the years. Germans were better informed but it 
would be wrong to say that British attitudes were inherently uninterested 
merely that there was no encouragement from politicians or the Media 
to help them become better informed. And this lack of information 
clearly had an effect on attitudes to the Community. As Bibes et al. 
and others have suggested, the British were prone to blame the 
Community for their ills. But Marwick's point about British 
insecurity rang true for both nations in some respects. The Germans 
too were uneasy at times. 
The spectre of nationalism certainly was a feature of British 
attitudes but it also was found in Germany to quite a strong degree. 
Bibes et al. suggested that in Germany there was a demand for faster 
and more complete implemen~ation of common policies which too often 
. f 7 h . were held back by the cr~ses o recent years. But were t ey, as ~t 
would appear, prepared to go very far down the road to integration? 
I would argue that desire for common policies was an example of a 
widespread German desire to protect their own interests. Support 
was exp~essed where there were clear benefits but they were not, as 
we have seen, prepared to submerge national identity completely. 
Hence continued support for the German flag and consistent national 
pride. The British did not believe that they were doing well out 
of Community membership but perhaps the reason for this displeasure 
could be seen in their attitudes to Community ac.tions. They expected 
more action on the part of the Community in terms of proposals to 
help the British economic situation and one could see that there 
was support for Community behaviour when they felt that they were 
gaining. 
Perhaps there was some truth in claims that the Community 
was being seen in mainly economic terms: I certainly would suggest 
one could apply this epithet to both nations. I would argue that 
there was a clear tendency in both nations to indicate high degrees 
13 3 
of instrumentalism in terms of European development and integration. 
Many Germans were worried about the international situation and 
foreign policy. One might well suggest that they supported integration 
in order to protect themselves - "an insurance network of nations". 
The British, in spite of opposition to membership, clearly wanted 
to benefit from membership. Rather than voting en masse for anti-
Community parties however they expressed apathy and complained of 
lack of knowledge in the European Elections. It may well be that the 
constant criticisms of the Media reflected their own confusion and 
ambivalent situation about the Community. 
They viewed Community membership out of self-interested eyes 
and one gained the clear impression that the volatility of the 
British public would manifest itself in favour of the Community if 
there were signs of major economic benefits. And their insecurity 
of the world outside was evident. There did not appear to be any 
real desire for entering the harsh world outside of protective 
Community tariffs and politically the British shared many attitudes 
on foreign policy with the Germans. The British and the Germans 
shared many similar attitudes, perhaps not to the same degree but 
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their general outlook to life did not appear significantly different 
and nor did their basic inherent relatively traditional and conservative 
attitudes to politics. 
I commented that the British had no desire to change the status 
quo, nor I would suggest did the Germans. British one-sidedness was 
a factor to consider and it did dominate British attitudes to the 
Community, being very visible in what was expected of the newly 
elected M.E.P.s; in.British eyes_especially they were expected to 
work for national interests before Community interests. The far 
greater degree of polarisation in British politics made it far less 
likely that any consensus view would emerge on European integration. 
The British appeared to be caught between two stools; they were 
unhappy over membership yet considered the Community important and 
indeed anticipated that they might still be members at the end of 
the century. This is illustrated by their surprisingly favourable 
long-term views about the future of the Community. Paradoxically 
they did not like change and much as they wanted the Community to 
develop along lines which they preferred, at the same time they 
worried incessantly at the effects of the Community on their own 
country. But it was doubtful if, given the chance, they would not 
take the same 1975 decision to remain as this would not only bring 
insecurity but also upset the new status quo. The picture of the 
British with their backs to the wall defending their national insti-
tutions yet being willing to claw as much as they could from their 
membership in terms of money and benefits was one with more than a 
small ring of truth in it. 
What of the Germans? They accepted further unification and 
progress in that direction more than the British but it would seem 
as much out of a sense of self-interest as idealism, and they were 
actually the least supportive of helping Community members in trouble 
if personal sacrifices were required. The Germans were happy to 
accept Community policies in principle and would work for unity 
but not if it involved too much German sacrifice. Both clearly had 
instrumental outlooks which manifested themselves in different 
ways. Perhaps one could say that the fundamental situation was that 
of German determination to support the Community and make changes 
where she might gain, (expansion equalling security). For the 
British it was a question of, "We're in the Community, we won't 
change, let them change to suit us so we get some benefit out of 
membership." 
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